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I. What eClaC proposes: ContInuIty 
and neW dIreCtIons
This	document	builds	on	and	expands	the	vision	set	out	by	ECLAC	in	
Time for equality: closing gaps, opening trails. Holding equality as a core value 
and a guiding principle, as then framed, means spreading capacity-building, 
technological progress, ample job opportunities and universal access to 
social	benefits	and	protections	throughout	the	production	structure	and	
weaving them into the very fabric of  society. 
Equality is also a condition for the exercise of  the civil, political, 
economic, social, cultural and environmental rights that full citizenship 
entails. It requires a deliberative democratic order in which all stakeholders 
take part and are heard. The State has a central role to play here, in 
safeguarding those rights through provision of  incentives, redistribution, 
regulation and oversight. Social covenants are essential for progressing 
towards this goal, conjugating equality in terms of  broad-based discussion, 
redistribution	of 	the	benefits	of 	growth	and	access	to	the	links	of 	social	
inclusion that ensure full entitlement. 
Putting equality front and centre means breaking with the economic 
paradigm that has prevailed in the region for at least 30 years. This change 
comes	at	a	good	time	for	many	of 	the	countries	of 	Latin	America	and	the	
Caribbean, with (i) pent-up citizen demands that have redrawn the region’s 
political map over the past 10 years; (ii) States and governments that are 
more inclined to make social investments and draw on redistributive 
mechanisms, as seen in the systematic increase in social spending and in 
countercyclical policies, especially those deployed to cushion the social 
costs	of 	the	2008	global	financial	crisis	and	its	aftermath;	(iii)	the	growing	
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set of  rights-based, more universalist policies taking shape in spheres 
like employment, health, pensions and retirement; and (iv) international 
summits and a global democratic imaginary with equality of  rights at the 
top of  the agenda.
Putting equality on the agenda marks a radical shift: in addition to 
raising the issue of  minimum income thresholds, it means discussing 
long-neglected	matters	of 	social	justice.	Among	them:	how	assets,	benefits	
and resources are distributed throughout society; what the redistributive 
role of  the State is as the main guarantor and promoter of  equality; how 
productivity gains in the economy are distributed among stakeholders; 
how to fashion a social-rights oriented regulatory framework requiring 
fiscal	 covenants	 concerning	 universal	 benefits;	 and	what	 spheres	 of 	
development see a negative or positive impact on equality. 




structure, technological development, divides in the sphere of  labour; 
macroeconomic management of  cycles; territorial organization; capacity-
building; social protections; and political participation. What is more, 
social equality is not incompatible with a growth dynamic capable of  
transforming the production structure. They complement each other. 
The	big	challenge	lies	in	finding	the	synergies	between	them.	So,	in	an	
integrated approach to development, equality is forged in a virtuous 
dynamic of  economic growth and steady gains in productivity with social 
inclusion and environmental sustainability. 
The shift away from old paradigms has taken on new dimensions. What 
are the pillars for this change, for the new approach to development 
proposed herein?
First, macroeconomic policy and industrial policy cannot continue on separate 
paths. They should be paired to build synergies between the short term and the long run. 
On	the	macroeconomic	front,	fiscal,	monetary	and	exchange-rate	policy	
should do more than promote nominal stability and smooth the business 
cycle. They can, at the same time, encourage long-term investment, 
production	structure	diversification	and,	above	all,	greater	productivity	
convergence throughout the economy. Government investment plays 
a crucial role in guiding and promoting structural change by spurring 
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complementary private investment and identifying sectors and activities 
that will see the most growth down the line. In turn, increased production 
diversification	with	 greater	 incorporation	 of 	 technological	 progress,	
smaller productivity gaps and improved energy and environmental 
efficiency	 are	 crucial	 for	 shielding	 the	 economy	 from	 cycle	 volatility	 
—especially	in	the	face	of 	external	shocks	that	are	magnified	by	volatility.	
So, the potential synergies between macroeconomy and structure, 
between business cycle and growth trend, and between the short term 
and the long run pose a challenge: how to best combine macroeconomic 
policy with industrial and technology policy. Macroeconomics for 
development cannot decouple cycle and stability (both real and nominal) 
from structural change or from faster long-term growth. Pairing them 
calls for an integrated approach that makes structural change an explicit 
priority and levels up social capacities and opportunities. Macroeconomic 
policy with a broader set of  goals and instruments is thus part of  the 
proposal and part of  the change in course.
Second, industrial policy should play a key role in steering development. This, 
too, is a shift. For 20 years, the political agenda treated industrial policy, 
like equality, as anathema. But there is increasing recognition that such policies 
have played a central role in all the countries that have succeeded in narrowing their 
technology, productivity and competitiveness gaps with economies on the technology 
frontier. The lock-in of  specialization patterns and technology paths 
based on static comparative advantages calls for a new set of  incentives 
to redirect investment and transform the production structure by 
incorporating greater value added, targeting sectors on the basis of  
productivity leaps that radiate out to society as a whole, promoting sectors, 
activities and technology paths that are environmentally sustainable and 
disseminate technological innovation faster and more systemically.
In the approach set out herein, industrial policy points in two 
complementary directions: boosting the capacities and competitiveness of  
existing sectors with obvious potential for growth and for incorporating 
technological progress; and diversifying the production structure by 
creating new, high-productivity sectors that are more environmentally 
sustainable	and	efficient.	Added	 to	 this	 is	 the	pressing	need	 to	 foster	
greater productivity among microenterprises and small and medium-sized 
businesses (SMEs), especially in view of  their capacity to create jobs and 
to become hubs for the dissemination of  knowledge and the appropriation 
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of  technology. Investment in SMEs, both formal and informal, should 
no	longer	represent	a	marginal	share	of 	public	investment.	Such	firms	
account for more than half  of  the workforce and tend to have very low 
levels of  productivity. SME policy should be tied in with policy geared 
towards structural change, clearing the way for smaller enterprises in fast-
growing sectors with high potential for increasing productivity. 
Third, this industrial policy is set within an industrial revolution encompassing 
new information and communication technologies, biotechnology and nanotechnology. 
Industrial	 policy	 should	 dovetail	with	 developments	 on	 the	 scientific	
and industrial frontier, where new knowledge paradigms turn into new 
production modes at an ever increasing speed. For this same reason there 
is no avoiding the importance of  investing in research and development: 
the cost of  being a bystander to changing patterns of  knowledge and 
production is too high. Because knowledge creation and the translation 
of  knowledge into technology and productivity keep pace with each 
other, any discussion of  structural change must include these new ways 
of  pairing knowledge and production. It also calls for targeted strategies 
for mastering the new paradigm.
Fourth, environmental sustainability should not continue to be a second-class issue 
on the development agenda. It must be coupled with structural change and a 
pattern	of 	sector	diversification	that	is	in	tune	with	sustainability.	Doing	so	
calls for social covenants where the State plays a key role in promoting the 
environmental dimension as a part of  —not a constraint on— industrial 
policy. Sustainable development needs an industry structure that is quite 
different from the one currently in place in most countries. Faster growth 
that does not do irreparable damage to the environment can only be 
achieved	with	structural	change	that	redefines	sectors	and	technologies	
and the production matrix itself  and retargets efforts in the spheres of  
research,	development,	innovation	and	learning.	During	paradigm	shifts	
when	patterns	are	still	flexible	and	alternate	paths	still	open,	societies	need,	
more than ever, the political will to steer production and technology on 
a course that considers future generations and the long term. This opens 
ample space for legitimacy and international cooperation on proactive 
industrial policy that promotes structural change with sustainability. Such 
legitimacy is often denied to other kinds of  industrial policy. 
Fifth, on the social front the challenge lies in the State taking on a more robust, 
firmer role in charting a universalist policy course. The development of  workers’ 
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capacities so as to allow them to enter into new, high-technology and 
knowledge-intensive production patterns is a right that should be within 
the reach of  all. This calls for a society where capacities for functioning 
as citizens and in the workplace are quickly and sustainably disseminated 
and expanded, and informal-sector workers are progressively absorbed 
into formal employment. 
Intrinsic to the equality of  rights agenda is a minimum standard of  
well-being for all citizens that is progressive over time and is in step with 
the positive impacts of  structural change. The State and tax policy should 
therefore play an increasingly robust role in providing social protection 
networks that are more inclusive and integrated, especially in a region 
where	most	of 	the	countries	have	much	unfinished	business	in	this	regard.	
But structural change, in prioritizing sectors and activities and in 
strategically creating new ones, triggers job loss in the short run. New jobs 
can take a long time to appear or require skills that are still not available 
in the labour market. To avoid the social costs of  this process, the State 
must	therefore	step	in	to	ensure	an	income	for	those	who	are,	at	first,	at	
most risk for job loss because of  sector recomposition. Policies should 
be geared towards actively training workers in the skills needed in new, 
fast-growing sectors whose footprint in the economy is growing. Income-
transfer mechanisms should therefore be coupled with appropriate 
training aimed at reinserting the economically active population into the 
new patterns of  production. And it is crucial that changes in education 
keep pace with structural change. 
Here, there are two ways to look at social policy. On the one hand, 
it goes along with and supports the transition to a more dynamic 
structure. On the other hand, it helps build that structure over time. 
On the one hand, social policy is a palliative measure that prevents 
inequalities from increasing during the shift to the new structure. On 
the other hand, it promotes training and the incorporation of  workers 
into the modern formal labour market and is a necessary investment 
for structural change.
In a way, this focus on social factors runs counter to another 
dominant paradigm that embodies, above all, recommendations now 
issuing	from	the	financial	world	in	the	face	of 	the	financial	crisis	sweeping	
Europe. Criticisms of  the welfare State abound. Recommendations mirror 
those	that	so	harshly	hit	the	societies	of 	Latin	America	during	the	debt	
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crisis	and	the	lost	decade	of 	the	1980s:	fiscal	restraint	with	an	emphasis	
on slashing social spending and public investment. 
In	 contrast	 to	 that	 paradigm,	which	 swept	 across	Latin	America	
during the debt crisis and is doing so now in Europe, what is put 
forward herein is the importance of  strengthening the social role of  
the State. Social investment is needed not only to make development 
more egalitarian but also because such investment is more consistent 
with a dynamic economy that boosts the average productivity of  society 
through training and education while maintaining domestic demand at 
levels needed to re-start economic activity.
In short, this proposal is grounded in structural change as the path, public policy 
as the instrument and equality as the core value steering the course of  change. When 
structural	change	narrows	productivity	gaps,	diversifies	the	production	
structure	and	adds	value	 to	productivity,	 the	working	world	benefits	
in terms of  equality because wage gaps close; contributory social 
protection coverage expands as more quality jobs are created; steady 
growth	at	higher	rates	improves	the	fiscal	position,	in	turn	enhancing	
redistributive action by the State; and infrastructure improvements 
broaden access to services. A more integrated economy grounded in 
a	more	 diversified	 and	 knowledge-intensive	 production	matrix	 also	
means a society where it is politically more feasible to reach stakeholder 
covenants on how to more equally distribute the wealth arising from 
leaps in productivity. And as jobs are drawn into the formal sector 
and become more productive it becomes easier to establish dialogue 
among agents in the working world as the institutional foundation for 
advancing towards full social rights.
The structural change for equality proposed herein is neither a closed 
formula	nor	a	one-size-fits-all	action	list.	This	document	lays	out	concrete	
policy proposals for working towards this goal. But, in implementing 
them,	 the	 economic,	 institutional	 and	political	 conditions	 specific	 to	
each country must be weighed. There is no single model: the region’s 
heterogeneity requires tailored approaches to devise public policies. 
Some	countries	already	have	a	more	diversified	and	integrated	production	
structure. Others have a more consolidated institutional framework with 
more experience in public policy management. And in others the baseline 
levels of  inequality and informality are less acute. What this means is that 
the sequence and pace of  progress on the policy front, as well as the 
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policy mix, will depend on the situation in each country. Besides, structural 
change for equality cannot be undertaken other than in a democratic 
context, with social covenants that legitimize the coordinating, guiding 
role of  the State. Such covenants have their own dynamic and timing in 
each country, which should be respected if  policies are to be successful 
and tap fully into the synergies discussed above.  
The following chapters look at structural change in all its dimensions 
and interrelations, spotlighting it as the linchpin of  development. Patterns 
of 	 structural	 change	 are	 identified,	where	 the	 virtuous	 pattern	 that	
should	be	the	goal	combines	job	growth,	an	expanding	GDP	and	higher	
labour productivity. The complementarities between structural change 
and environmental sustainability should also be tapped, especially by 
incorporating the technology revolution. 
Subsequent sections examine the link between macroeconomic policy 
and structural change, stressing the relationship between production 
structure	and	cyclical	fluctuations	in	different	phases	of 	the	development	
process	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean,	including	import	substitution	
industrialization, the impact of  global liquidity cycles (particularly in the 
1970s and 1990s) and the recent surge in exports and in the international 
price of  natural resources. Fallout from external shocks, combined with 
the macroeconomic policy response and weak or non-existent industrial 
policy, has brought low investment rates that fall short of  bridging 
technology and productivity gaps. Procyclical policies in the past often 
worsened recessions and exacerbated the underutilization of  capital and 
labour, discouraging investment even further. A trend towards exchange-
rate appreciation has emerged in some countries, working against the 
production of  tradable goods (by making them less competitive and 
raising the pressure to substitute local production with imports) and 
hinders access to the economies of  scale that the global market provides. 
Cycles and policy responses have thus had lasting impacts on production 
structure and the accumulation of  technological capacities.
Further along, a look at the social dimension of  structural 
change shows how the region is still marked by a pattern with acute 
productivity gaps. This pattern, in turn, limits the social inclusion 
capacity of  employment and reinforces the poor functional distribution 
of  income (among the factors of  production) and the poor distribution 
of  household income.
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Last,	a	set	of 	industrial,	macroeconomic,	social	and	labour	policies	
is put forward for advancing towards virtuous structural change that can 
combine a shift in the production matrix towards sectors that are more 
productive and environmentally sustainable (incorporating technological 
progress and narrowing gaps between sectors); proactive macroeconomic 
policy for managing cycles to encourage productivity and investment 
(positively pairing cycle and trend for the short term and the long run); and 
social and labour policies that team structural change with redistributive 
impacts, improvements in the working world and fairer distribution of  
productivity gains among the factors of  production. 
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II. struCtural ChanGe as a Key  
VeCtor oF deVelopMent
Structural change has always been at the heart of  development theory. 
This vision dates back to, among others, Schumpeter and his idea of  
development as a process of  “creative destruction” giving rise to new 
sectors	while	others	decline	as	innovations	appear	and	spread.	Later	
on, the pioneers of  development theory studied this process in the 
context of  an international system with marked asymmetries between 
countries, regions and territories in terms of  technological capacities 
and the participation of  knowledge-intensive sectors in the production 
structure (Prebisch, 1949; Hirschman, 1958). These asymmetries are 
subject to increasing returns and the cumulative forces that reproduce 
them and, in some cases, strengthen them over time. For this reason, 
in the absence of  industrial policy, most creative processes are 
concentrated in the developed economies. Technology and income 
divides are not self-correcting, as proven in the 1990s during the debate 
over convergence and divergence between countries on the technology 
frontier and the laggards. 
The economic literature has made strides in understanding 
why some economies have achieved technology and productivity 
convergence with the global leaders while others fall farther behind. 
There are not many cases of  convergence in the store of  international 
experience, but they do provide useful lessons on what made them 
possible. These lessons are discussed below.
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a. patterns of growth: productivity, employment  
and structural change
Structural	change	that	sustains	development	is	change	that	diversifies	
the economy and shifts a larger share of  the production structure 
over to sectors that are more knowledge-intensive (Schumpeterian 
efficiency)	 or	 have	 faster-growing	 demand	 (Keynesian	 or	 growth	
efficiency,	according	to	Dosi,	Pavitt	and	Soete,	1990).	The	combination	
of 	both	kinds	of 	efficiency	in	the	production	structure	is	called	dynamic	
efficiency	 because	 it	 yields	 higher	 rates	 of 	 growth	 in	 productivity,	
innovation and employment. 
Desirable	structural	change	—the kind that strengthens sectors 
with	dynamic	efficiency—	is	defined	and	evaluated	according	to	its	
aggregate effects on the economic system. Structural change is not 
virtuous if  it merely creates more high-technology enclaves or if  
changes	 only	 occur	 in	 the	most	 efficient	 parts	 of 	 the	 production	
structure. The dissemination of  technology and the expansion of  
demand should not boost just a handful of  companies but rather the 
economy as a whole by means of  forward and backward linkages. 
The process leads to a more even distribution of  medium- and high-
productivity activities that make the production matrix denser. As 
part of  this process of  structural change, new agents emerge and the 
workforce increasingly moves away from low-productivity sectors to 
new sectors that populate the space between pioneering activities and 
subsistence	activities	(ECLAC,	2007).	
Employment dynamics are, then, a central element in any process 
of 	 structural	 change.	Developing	 economies	 have	 strong	 structural	
heterogeneity,	 with	 a	 significant	 portion	 of 	 the	workforce	 engaged	
in the informal sector or in subsistence activities. This contingent 
of  workers has very low rates of  productivity, to the detriment of  
income distribution and average income in the economy. With virtuous 
structural change, new sectors and activities are created that absorb 
the reserve of  workers into more productive, better quality and higher 
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paid	 jobs.	The	force	that	reduces	heterogeneity	 is	 the	diversification	
associated with structural change.
Knowing	 whether	 structural	 change	 will	 foster	 development	
requires an examination of  how productivity and employment levels 
change over time. In a process of  virtuous growth, productivity and 
employment expand together (although not necessarily at the same 
pace), and growth does not generate unsustainable pressure on the 
external sector. Whereas in the most successful countries outside the 
region there is continuity in employment and productivity gains over 
time,	 in	Latin	America	 and	 the	Caribbean	 periods	 of 	 job	 creation	
(with lagging or declining productivity) alternate with periods of  
productivity gains with very little in the way of  job creation. So, there 
are growth patterns in the region where no country has managed to 
pair, over the long run, strong job growth (a prerequisite for reducing 
the domestic income gap and poverty) with productivity gains (a 
prerequisite for narrowing the productivity gap in a world in full-
fledged	technology	revolution).
A pattern of  growth that creates a “virtuous circle” like the one 
described in diagram 1 is consistent with the goal of  increasing levels 
of 	equality.	In	such	a	pattern,	the	structure’s	dynamic	efficiency	allows	
for fast growth while narrowing the technology gap. The structure 
is	 transformed	 to	 redefine	 external	 insertion	 and	 the	 nature	 of 	
employment as the number of  quality jobs in the economy rises. The 
opposite	 takes	place	 in	a	“vicious	circle”	pattern	where	slow	GDP	
growth	translates	into	slow	employment	growth	and	flat	or	declining	
productivity while waning investment deepens technology and income 
gaps with the rest of  the world. The other patterns involve either 
“defensive adjustment” (where just a few activities are modernized and 
compete, while most jobs and most of  the economy do not reap the 
benefits	of 	technology	diffusion)	or	a	“job	absorption”	model,	with	
weak structural change, in which the expansion of  low-productivity 
activities —often involving non-tradable sectors— hinges on booming 
natural resource exports. 
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No structural change Structural change  
limited to enclaves
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J.A 
Ocampo, “The quest for dynamic efficiency: structural dynamics and economic growth 
in developing countries”, Beyond Reforms, Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic 
Vulnerability, Stanford University Press, and R. Astorga, M. Cimoli and G. Porcile, 
“Technological upgrading and employment: patterns from developing economies”, 2012.
Table 1 shows productivity and employment growth for several of  
the region’s economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico) between 
1960 and 2010. These rates are compared with those seen in the Republic 
of 	Korea,	which	is	used	as	a	point	of 	reference	because	it	represents	
one of  the most successful cases of  technology, production and income 
catch-up	of 	the	post-war	era.	The	countries	of 	Latin	America	did	have	
some periods of  virtuous growth but could not maintain the pattern 
consistently:	productivity	stagnated	or	declined	in	the	1980s	(see	figure	1).	
This decline was accompanied by job losses in higher-productivity sectors 
and a migration of  workers to subsistence activities or underemployment, 
which tended to bring down the average productivity of  the economy. 
This	movement	is	the	flip	side	of 	regressive	structural	change.	By	contrast,	
changes	in	the	pattern	of 	specialization	in	the	Republic	of 	Korea	ensured	
the expansion of  demand and output, creating jobs in high productivity 
activities for workers previously engaged in lower productivity activities 
and	improving	income	distribution	(ECLAC,	2007;	Cimoli	and	Rovira,	




latIn aMerICa (seleCted CountrIes) and repuBlIC oF Korea:  
output and laBour produCtIVIty GroWth, 1965-2010
(Percentages)
Period GDP Employment Productivity
Argentina
1965-1975 4.20 1.28 2.65 
1976-1981 1.52 1.84 -0.29 
1982-1990 -0.90 2.34 -3.19 
1991-2001 3.86 1.29 2.53 
2002-2010 5.56 3.51 1.92 
Brazil
1965-1981 7.22 3.60 3.77 
1982-1992 1.99 3.73 -1.68 
1993-1998 3.33 1.71 1.60 
1999-2010 3.38 1.93 1.45 
Chile
1965-1973 2.96 1.35 1.91 
1974-1981 4.03 0.87 3.24 
1982-1985 0.25 2.39 -2.07 
1986-1998 7.28 3.29 3.88 
1999-2010 3.43 1.08 2.33 
Mexico
1965-1981 6.69 4.69 1.83 
1982-1994 1.87 3.46 -1.55 
1995-2000 3.51 2.72 0.73 
2001-2010 1.81 1.18 0.62 
Republic of Korea
1965-1980 8.20 3.64 4.71 
1981-1990 8.74 2.84 5.76 
1991-2000 6.19 1.61 4.46 
2001-2010 4.16 1.35 2.77 
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
note:  The periods used are specific to each country and were chosen based on the principal 
shocks and policy changes in each one.
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Figure 1








































































Productivity in Asia (simple average)
Productivity in Asia (weighted average)
Productivity in Latin America (simple average)
Productivity in Latin America (weighted average)
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Since	the	1990s,	the	Republic	of 	Korea’s	growth	has	been	propelled	
more by productivity than by employment, as is to be expected in an 
economy that has already absorbed most subsistence jobs, substantially 
raised real wages and increasingly competes on quality. The same dynamic 
has	not	been	seen	in	Latin	America,	not	even	during	the	post-2004	boom.	
Figure 2 shows the dissimilar intensity of  structural change towards 
dynamic	efficiency	in	Asia	and	in	Latin	America.	It	compares	two	groups	
(one	comprising	Latin	American	countries	and	the	other	made	up	of 	
seven very dynamic economies in developing East Asia). The horizontal 
axis tracks an indicator of  structural change towards Schumpeterian 
efficiency	 (share	 of 	 high-tech	 sectors	 in	 total	 exports).	 The	 vertical	
axis	 tracks	 an	 indicator	 of 	Keynesian	or	 growth	 efficiency	 (ability	 to	
penetrate the fastest-growing markets, represented by the increase the 
country’s share of  global exports). The Asian countries rapidly changed 
their	export	profile,	moving	towards	high-tech	sectors	between	1985	and	
2011	while	increasing	their	share	of 	the	global	market	(reflecting	their	
ability to increase their long run rate of  growth with external balance). 
This	process	was	far	less	intense	in	the	countries	of 	Latin	America,	which	
did not approach Asia’s 1985 competitiveness levels until the mid-2000s 




latIn aMerICa and deVelopInG CountrIes In east asIa: pattern 































Specialization index (Xtech/Xi) 
Latin America Developing countries in Asia (7)
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the United 
Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) [online database] http://
comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx. 
a Technology exports are defined according to the classification used by Lall (2000). Latin America 
includes Central America, South America and Mexico. The developing countries of East Asia 
are Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines the 
Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand.
Generally	speaking,	 in	 the	Asian	economies	 included	 in	 the	figure,	
macroeconomic and industrial policies acted in concert with the objectives 
of  promoting growth and maintaining macroeconomic stability.1 A 
comparable	 level	of 	 consistency	 and	 coordination	 is	not	 seen	 in	Latin	
America, which has been subject to cycles of  exchange-rate appreciation, 
indebtedness,	fiscal	adjustment	and	recurring	balance-of-payments	crises	
that	were	influenced	by	sudden	capital	flow	stops	and	episodes	of 	financial	
contagion	 (ECLAC,	 1998	 and	 2010a;	Ffrench-Davis,	 2000	 and	 2006;	
Frenkel and Rapetti, 2011). The absence or withdrawal of  industrial policies 
during the 1980s and 1990s was particularly damaging in this context of  
real and nominal instability and, as discussed later, it dampened investment 
—especially	in	tradable	goods	(Cimoli	and	Katz,	2003;	Peres,	2010).
1 At the same time, the array of macroeconomic policy instruments was significantly more 
complex than what is generally accepted in economic thinking. Lending guidance policies, 
income policies and regulating the price of consumer wage goods (to cite a few policy 
instruments) were an integral part of the macroeconomic policy toolkit. See, among others, 
Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Chang (2001) and Gallagher and Porcekanzki (2010). 
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B.  technology revolution, structural change and 
environmental sustainability
Any discussion of  structural change must be inserted in the context of  two 
issues that are increasingly crucial for development. First, the technology 
revolution associated with new paradigms is transforming not only the 
economy but also the very dynamics of  society and politics. Second, the 
patterns	of 	production	and	growth	need	to	be	reconfigured	to	make	them	
environmentally sustainable.
Thinking about structural change must take account of  how the new 
paradigms impact technology paths and production sectors and systems. The 
dominant technology paradigm is undergoing changes of  such magnitude 
that they have been described as a new technology revolution. This is based 
on the coevolving paths being charted in nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
new materials and information and communications technologies, backed 
by	new	findings	in	physics	and	genetics.	Each	of 	these	fields	is	advancing	
rapidly on its own path, but what is most important is that they are tending 
to combine in processes that feed back into each other. The convergence 
of  these technologies could lead to a new industrial revolution given their 
potential applications, particularly in terms of  the digitalization of  production, 
the generation of  new materials, the synthesis of  biologically active substances 
and	a	lighter	environmental	burden	(van	Lieshout	and	others,	2008).	
With the emergence and development of  new paradigms there is, now 
more than ever, a need for industrial policy to keep developing countries 
from lagging farther behind. These paradigms are associated with robust 
economies of  scale and networks that enhance the competitiveness of  capital- 
and technology-rich economies. In other areas, personalized information and 
communications technology niche markets have the potential for making 
economies of  scale less important. In both cases, the new sectors need 
technology complementarities and access to advanced infrastructure in order 
to remain competitive. Building dynamic comparative advantages depends on 
public investment and on policies that encourage private investment and foster 
coordination between agents and institutions (including those that operate 
in	the	field	of 	science	and	technology)	in	order	to	obtain	synergy	effects.
Another core dimension of  the path to structural change that will be 
a determining factor in coming years is environmental sustainability. Societies 
are increasingly aware of  this issue and are coming to value it more amid 
mounting evidence of  climate change and environmental degradation (with 
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significant	consequences	 for	 the	quality	of 	 life	of 	 the	poorest	 segments	
of 	 society).	Deployment	of 	 such	policies	 is	 lagging	behind	 the	 serious	
environmental problems they should address, but there is no question that 
any long-term strategy for structural change should include a transition 
towards technologies and production systems that are far less polluting than 
at present. This goes beyond public policy geared towards stimulating target 
sectors. It means promoting a ground-shift in production and consumer 
systems	and	in	technology	paths	themselves.	Doing	so	calls	for	redefining	
the very approach to development. 
The current development model depends on static comparative 
advantages consisting of  exploiting abundant natural resources. This channels 
investment, innovation and technological development in that direction and 
encourages energy intensity (especially the use of  fossil fuels). This is why 
there	is	such	a	strong	correlation	between	GDP	growth,	energy	consumption	
and	pollutant	emissions	(see	figure	3).	This	bias	towards	the	dominant	pattern,	
together with a failure to internalize the costs of  deteriorating natural resources 
and	ecosystems,	has	held	back	structural	change	towards	more	efficient	and	
knowledge-intensive activities with a smaller environmental impact. 
Figure 3
latIn aMerICa: per CapIta Gdp and per CapIta enerGy 
ConsuMptIon, 2008 a
(Kilograms of oil equivalent and 2005 purchasing power parity dollars)
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source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) [online database] http://databank.
worldbank.org/.
a The size of the circles indicates the level of each country’s per capita emissions. The colours 
correspond to the different subregions: blue: South America; red: Central America; orange: 
the Caribbean.
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The current patterns of  production and consumption are unsustainable 
because in the medium and long term they erode the material foundation 
on which they are built (Stern, 2007; de Miguel and Sunkel, 2011). From 
the	 standpoint	 of 	 Schumpeterian	 efficiency,	 greater	 opportunities	 for	
investing in clean technologies (such as those that are low in carbon 
emissions) can spur long-term economic development with structural 
change where countries move from the production of  and international 
trade in traditional, low-productivity goods to other, more modern and 
dynamic ones with high productivity. 
If 	the	region	is	to	benefit	from	the	global	transition	towards	a	more	
environmentally friendly economy it will have to develop its industrial, 
scientific	and	technological	capacities	and	encourage	 investment,	 thus	
improving	its	systemic	competitiveness	(ECLAC,	2008).2 A region with 
remarkable natural resource diversity whose indigenous peoples have such 
a wealth of  knowledge about the use of  biodiversity and ecosystems has 
a competitive advantage that, if  valued and safeguarded, would enable it 
to reduce poverty, protect the environment and create sectors that are at 
the leading edge internationally.
In sum, the need to transition to a development model whose 
guiding principle is equality, that progresses simultaneously towards 
social development, economic growth and environmental sustainability, 
poses an imperative for change for the region and the world. Forging 
a paradigm for sustainable development with equality would converge 
with structural change if  there are effective mechanisms for managing 
the economy that take into account the cost of  the environmental 
degradation, biodiversity loss and large carbon footprints that are putting 
global climate security at risk.
2 UNCTAD has highlighted the potential of “green growth poles” in promoting energy efficiency, 




III. CyCle, trend and the relatIonshIp 
BetWeen MaCroeConoMIC polICy  
and struCtural ChanGe
a. relationship between production structure  
and cycle fluctuations
Macroeconomic policy shapes the production structure, and the production 
structure in turn determines the space available for macroeconomic policy as 
well as its effects on the economy. From this perspective, it is more accurate 
to speak of  cycle and trend as coevolving rather than as two separate 
dimensions of  economic growth. The coevolution of  the production 
structure and the business cycle is based on transmission mechanisms 
whereby these variables interact with and condition each other over time. 
The analysis starts with the idea that the balance of  payments plays a central 
role in the macroeconomic dynamic (Ocampo and others, 2010) and the 
way in which structural factors of  trade and specialization are linked to 
financial	market	and	terms	of 	trade	shocks.	
First, an economy’s capacity to respond to external shocks depends on its 
production structure. The link between the production structure and cyclical 
fluctuations	can	be	seen	most	clearly	in	economies	whose	export	basket	
depends on a handful of  commodities subject to highly volatile demand 
and prices determined by the international market. In this case, the cycle 
of  economic activity, and thus employment, is heavily dependent on 
the ups and downs of  just a few markets. This is precisely one of  the 
mechanisms	identified	in	the	literature	to	explain	why	dependence	on	
natural resources can slow long-term growth: the volatility associated with 
that dependence is a drag on investment, and by extension, on long-term 
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growth. At the other extreme are economies where knowledge-intensive 







Second, structure impacts cycle through the long-term growth rate compatible with 
external balance. This growth rate keeps the ratio between current account 
deficit	and	GDP	at	manageable	levels	where	it	is	not	difficult	to	obtain	




increasing, an adjustment (less absorption) will be needed in the form 
of  a reduction in autonomous public and private spending, in different 
proportions depending on the initial conditions and policy constraints. In 
the	long	run,	fiscal	policy	hinges	on	the	leeway	provided	by	the	long-term	
balanced growth rate. If  a structural change raises this rate and all other 
factors	remain	constant,	it	would	be	possible	to	increase	fiscal	spending	
without putting destabilizing pressure on the current account.
Macroeconomic policy and the business cycle have, in turn, effects 
on the production structure. There are four transmission mechanisms between 
macroeconomic policy and production structure.4 They are:
(i) the effect of  policies on the use of  installed capacity, which in turn 
influences	investment	amounts	(accelerator	effect);
(ii) the effect of  an increase in aggregate demand on the rate of  technical 
progress	(Kaldor-Verdoorn	effect,	which	links	rising	production	to	
productivity gains); 
(iii) the effects of  policies on macro prices, which shape the differences 
in	rates	of 	return	across	sectors,	and	thus	define	where	investment	
will go, following the signals of  expected return; and
(iv) the crowding-in effect of  public investment at different phases of  
the cycle. 
3 See Alleyne and Francis (2008); Cimoli (1988 and 1992); Barbosa-Filho (2002); Moreno-Brid 
(2002); and Thirlwall (1979 and 2011). 
4 The functioning of transmission channels from macroeconomic policy to structure is complex 
and also includes intermediate effects on income distribution and the demand for consumer 
goods, which are not examined in this section.
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These effects connect macroeconomic policy with the level and 
composition of  investment and, therefore, with structural change. They 
thereby	help	 define	 future	productivity	 and	 employment	 paths	 (level,	
composition and quality) and act as a link between the long run and 
the	short	term	and	between	cycle	and	trend.	By	influencing	investment,	
macroeconomic policy shapes future growth. The irreversibility of  supply 
and growing returns on technology and on capacity-building paths are 
contributing factors. These paths should be preserved and encouraged. 
The recessionary phase of  a cycle of  economic activity can permanently 
destroy installed capacity (“a company can be destroyed in a day”), but 
the corresponding expansionary phase, of  the same duration, can be 
insufficient	 to	 replace	 lost	 capacity,	mainly	 because	 of 	 the	 lead	 time	
needed for individual and institutional training (“a company is not built 
in a day”). The mechanisms of  transmission between macroeconomic 
policy and structural change are discussed below. 
Managing aggregate demand and its effect on the use of  production capacity 
helps determine the level of  investment. Highly restrictive management, 
which results in long periods of  underutilization of  installed capacity, 
blunts the investment stimulus and disincentivizes expansion and 
modernization of  the stock of  capital assets. At the same time, the 
expansion of  aggregate demand and output in the short term generates 
production learning-by-doing that boosts productivity. Productivity 
tends to rise when production increases, owing to growing returns 
on economies of  scale and the accumulation of  experience, which 
expands the stock of  skills. Conversely, when the technology frontier is 
moving quickly, macroeconomic policy that unnecessarily slows growth 
will force the economy to face international competition with lagging 
technological capacities. 
Inasmuch as fiscal, monetary and exchange-rate policies affect macro prices they 
will impact relative sector profitability.	Differences	in	returns	are	a	key	signal	
for	investment	decisions	at	the	microeconomic	level.	When	firms	make	
decisions about which sectors to invest in, they are also making decisions 
about	the	future	configuration	of 	the	production	structure.	One	important	
macro price is the real exchange rate, whose effects on output composition 
(particularly the mix of  tradable and non-tradable goods and services 
and of  sectors with varying degrees of  technology dynamism) have 
been	broadly	identified	as	a	key	factor	linking	macroeconomic	policy	to	
growth. However, this is not the only possible channel for transmitting 
macroeconomic policy to the production structure. For example, interest 
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rate levels, restrictions on access to bank credit for start-ups (especially 
SMEs) have an adverse effect above all on innovative activities, whose 
rates of  return are more uncertain. Implicitly, this strengthens activities 
that reproduce the prevailing structure.
Macroeconomic policy interacts with and responds to shocks from the 
global economy. The following section discusses how this mix of  shocks 
and the policy responses to them have shaped cycle and trend in the region. 
B. external shocks, policy responses and business cycle
The external sector —more precisely, the behaviour of  the balance 
of  payments— is key to understanding the coevolution of  cyclical 
fluctuations	in	production	activity	(business	cycles)	and	the	long-term	
expansion	trend	or	path	of 	the	economy.	Modern	history	in	Latin	America	
and the Caribbean provides numerous cases that illustrate this relationship. 
There have been episodes of  strong growth driven by abundant foreign 
currency, the result of  substantial improvements in the terms of  trade 
and	access	to	the	global	financial	market	(as	happened,	for	example,	in	
the period following 2003, with the exception of  the worldwide recession 
of  2008-2009). There have also been cycles of  economic expansion 
accompanied by persistent current account deterioration and exchange-
rate	appreciation,	which	culminated	in	severe	currency	crises,	capital	flight,	
recession and job loss (as occurred in several economies in the region in 
the 1990s and in most of  them in the 1980s).
The relationship between external shocks and macroeconomic 
policies has key implications for growth and stability. The central role of  
the balance of  payments is based on the dynamic between four dimensions 
of  the external sector: 
(i) net exports (exports less imports);
(ii) payments to the factors of  production, especially remittances from 
migrant workers, remittance of  earnings on foreign capital, and 
interest payments;
(iii) terms of  trade effects; and
(iv) access to external financing and the volatility of  short-term 
capital	flows.
Historically,	the	first	three	components	dominated	the	dynamic	of 	
what was termed the external constraint on growth. Among them, in 




globalization began to take root in the 1970s, the fourth component 
became substantially more important and is a major source of  short-term 
fluctuations	in	the	rate	of 	growth.	
External balance of  payments shocks associated with the terms of  
trade and changes in liquidity (points (iii) and (iv) above) are key to the 
cycle dynamic, along with policy responses. These shocks, in addition to 
their short-term impacts, affect the long term as well to the extent that they 
affect macro prices and investment (which is to say that shocks change 
the	structural	component	that	determines	long-term	growth).	Significant	
and	sudden	fluctuations	in	access	to	capital	markets	(for	example,	due	
to	 a	massive	 influx	 of 	 short-term	 capital	 that	 sparks	 exchange-rate	
appreciation and creates stock or real estate market bubbles) can have deep 
and	lasting	effects	on	gross	fixed	capital	formation	and,	by	extension,	on	
the production structure and the pace of  economic and job growth. These 
destabilizing effects are more potent in a globalized world, particularly 
in economies that do not have instruments for regulating or managing 
international	capital	flows,	as	is	the	case	with	most	of 	the	countries	of 	the	
region.	The	cycle	and	its	link	to	structure	are	taken	up	below,	looking	first	
at pre-2000s cycles and then at the most recent commodity boom cycle.
C. Cycle patterns and structure
Latin	America’s	 production	 structure	 has	 not	 allowed	 it	 to	 take	 full	
advantage of  growing demand, whether global or domestic. This has 
been	a	long-standing	concern	at	ECLAC.	Due	to	the	prevailing	pattern	of 	
specialization, the income elasticity of  exports is very low in comparison 
with the income elasticity of  imports, so when growth accelerates in the 
region —a sine qua non condition for absorbing underemployment, 
reducing heterogeneity and promoting equality— imbalances in net 
exports of  goods and services emerge that slow expansion and have 
often unleashed balance-of-payments crises.
The structuralist approach links long-term growth to the production 
structure,	holding	that	income	elasticities	of 	imports	and	exports	reflect	
or are determined by the pattern of  specialization and the density of  
the production fabric. These elasticities help determine the long-term 
equilibrium growth rate and are a composite expression of  the degree of  
linkage between movements in domestic and external demand and the 
capacity to meet that demand endogenously by expanding production 
(ECLAC,	2007;	Gouvea	and	Lima,	2010;	McCombie	and	Thirlwall,	1999;	
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Cimoli and Porcile, 2011). With a dense production structure that is 
technologically sophisticated and allows for innovation, it is more likely 
that local production will respond dynamically to expanding domestic and 




after the international debt crisis brought it to a standstill in the 1980s) led 
to	growing	inflows	of 	international	capital,	both	direct	and	in	the	form	of 	
short-term	speculative	investment.	In	the	context	of 	financial	globalization,	
trade factors become less important in the short term while the components 
of 	the	balance	of 	trade	financial	account	come	to	figure	more	heavily.	In	
order	to	illustrate	this	relationship	and	place	it	in	its	historical	context,	figure	




three patterns in the relationship between these variables.5
Figure 4
latIn aMerICa: Goods and serVICes trade BalanCe deFICIt as  
































Balance of goods and services (% of GDP)
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
5 The variable presented in figure 4, which is a country-weighted average, basically reflects 
what happened with the larger economies, particularly Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which 
account for nearly two thirds of the GDP of Latin America. The story that emerges from the 




south aMerICa, Central aMerICa and MeXICo: Goods and 
serVICes BalanCe and Gdp GroWth, 1960-2011













Trade balance (percentages of GDP)
South America 1.0 -0.5 1.8 -0.6 3.4 1.8
Argentina 0.2 0.8 2.4 -0.7 8.2 4.2
Brazil -0.1 -1.9 2.0 -0.2 2.1 0.3
Central America -2.6 -3.5 -3.8 -6.1 -8.7 -10.6
Mexico -1.5 -1.9 2.5 -1.5 -1.7 -1.6
Average annual GDP growth (percentages)
South America 5.5 5.8 2.0 2.7 3.0 4.5
Argentina 4.7 3.0 -0.7 4.1 1.8 7.0
Brazil 6.3 8.0 3.1 1.7 3.0 4.1
Central America 5.7 5.7 1.8 4.7 3.6 4.7
Mexico 7.2 6.5 2.2 3.4 2.7 2.0
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
The	first	 pattern	 corresponds	 to	 the	 import	 substitution	period,	
characterized by stop-and-go growth cycles, which ran through the 
mid-1970s. The pace of  growth was high, and the goods and services 
balance was in equilibrium. The second pattern is one of  growth that 
is unsustainable because of  greater external vulnerability (persistent 
goods	and	services	balance	deficit).	It	is	seen	at	two	points	in	time:	the	
second half  of  the 1970s and in the 1990s. Each period ended in crisis 
and	a	recession:	the	lost	decade	of 	the	1980s	in	the	first	case	and	the	
lost half  decade (1998-2002) in the second. The third pattern is the one 
seen today in the largest net exporters of  natural resources, especially in 
South America and in Caribbean countries like Belize, Guyana, Suriname 
and Trinidad and Tobago. In the South American countries that export 
minerals, hydrocarbons and natural resource-intensive goods, the balance 
of 	 goods	 and	 services	 in	 2006-2011	moved	 from	deficit	 to	 surplus	
alongside fast economic expansion. Unlike in the 1980s and early 2000s, 
the	shift	towards	trade	surpluses	reflected	an	easing	of 	the	balance	of 	
payments, not an effort to service the debt. This made faster growth 




in favour of  countries that export natural resources, particularly minerals 
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and hydrocarbons. Although international liquidity levels remain high, the 
principal shock generated by the cycle of  the 2000s was the expansion 
of  global trade in commodities and an improvement in international 
prices	(see	figure	5).	This	had	significant	consequences	for	the	region’s	
external position, which as a whole moved to a goods and services balance 
surplus with faster growth. This new landscape, which is emerging as the 
Asian countries (especially China) come to account for a greater share of  
global	demand,	has	very	different	effects	across	the	region.	It	benefits	
most of  the South American countries, a few of  Caribbean countries 
and, to a lesser extent, Mexico, all of  which are net exporters of  natural 
resources. But it has a negative effect on Central America and part of  
the Caribbean (especially the service-based economies), which are in the 
opposite situation in this regard.6
Figure 5




























































MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) 
Mineral-exporting countries (Chile and Peru) 
Hydrocarbon-exporting countries 
(Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) 
Central America 
Mexico
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
official figures from the countries.
The problems and opportunities sparked by this new era of  global 
trade are, accordingly, different in each case. In South America, a path to 
faster economic growth is opening that, nonetheless, holds long-term risks 
due to its effects on the production structure and slackening investment 
6 For an analysis of the impact of the commodities boom in the Caribbean economies and the 
varying effects based on the degree of insertion of each in global trade (service-based and 
goods-based), see ECLAC (2002, chapter 11), and ECLAC (2003). 
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in tradable sectors not tied to natural resources. In Central America and 
some economies in the Caribbean, new pressures are being generated on 
the external sector because most of  these economies are net importers of  
energy and food. Furthermore, rising global agricultural prices introduce 
an	 imported	 inflation	 component	 that,	 by	 impacting	 food	prices,	 has	
adverse	distribution	effects.	The	situation	also	has	negative	fiscal	impacts,	
since government budgets are under pressure to cover a larger oil bill and 
grant subsidies to offset the impact on basic food basket prices. 
Those countries that are net exporters of  natural resources share some 
trends.	The	first	is	the	decline	in	external	debt	service	payments	as	a	percentage	
of  export earnings.7 Between 2000 and 2008, every country in South America 
substantially	reduced	 its	foreign	debt-to-GDP	ratio	and	changed	 its	debt	
stock	profile,	holding	less	short-term	debt	as	a	percentage	of 	total	debt	and	
borrowing at lower rates. A second aspect has been the increase in foreign 
currency	reserves,	which,	combined	with	an	improved	fiscal	position	and	
lower	inflation,	has	facilitated	access	to	international	credit	at	lower	interest	
rates. This is one of  the factors underlying the region’s unprecedented 
resilience in coping with the latest global crisis, of  2008 and 2009. 
Much of  the favourable external impact is more of  a price effect 
than a volume effect, and there is acute vulnerability to a global economic 
slowdown, especially in the Chinese economy. In South America, 
expansion does not reflect endogenous capacity-building despite 
improvements on several fronts during the 2000s. It is the outcome of  
new patterns of  global demand that have galvanized the markets for 
South America’s traditional export goods. In other words, the improved 
external performance of  South America is, to a large extent, a result of  
endogenous capacity-building and convergence in the Asian economies 
—not	Latin	America’s—	which	have	(at	least	for	the	time	being)	redrawn	
the	global	trade	map	in	a	way	that	has	benefitted	exporters	of 	natural	
resources. South America has yet to take up the challenge of  converting 
the exogenous momentum of  Asian demand into an endogenous 
transformation of  its own production structure that internalizes the 
forces of  development and makes them permanent. 
The situation in other subregions is more heterogeneous. Whereas 
some economies in the Caribbean have high external debt levels (above 
7 For example, in Colombia and Peru, interest payments on debt as a percentage of total return 
to foreign capital fell from as high as 82.8% and 93.7% in 1999 to 26.3% and 9.3% in 2010, 
respectively.




including the Bahamas, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago, the levels 
are below 10% (Alleyne, Hendrickson and Amonde, 2011). Patterns 
in Central America also vary. Whereas external debt climbed between 
2002 and 2010 in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama, it fell 
sharply	in	countries	benefitting	from	the	Heavily	Indebted	Poor	Countries	
initiative:	Honduras	and	Nicaragua	(ECLAC,	2011).	In	Central	America	
and some Caribbean countries, two other variables are helping ease 
external	vulnerability.	These	are	export	diversification	based	on	assembly-
for-export operations and foreign currency remittances from emigrants 
(an increasingly important component in the balance of  payments).
These	 trends	 on	 the	 external	 front	 in	 Latin	America	 and	 the	
Caribbean have been accompanied by changes in macroeconomic strategy 
that	to	some	extent	reflect	lessons	learned	from	negative	experiences	with	
fixed	exchange	rates	in	the	1990s.	During	that	decade,	some	countries	
had stabilization programmes that used the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor8	for	inflation	expectations.	This	kind	of 	strategy	tended	to	change	
in the 2000s. Aside from the countries that have adopted the dollar as 
their currency (Ecuador, El Salvador and Panama) and some of  the 
smaller and more open economies in the region that have maintained 
their	fixed	exchange-rate	parity	regimes	(for	example,	Barbados,	Belize	
and the member countries of  the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union), 
other	 economies	 have	moved	 towards	more	 flexible	 exchange	 rates.	
Examples	of 	this	include	inflation-targeting	regimes	instituted	in	Brazil,	
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru between the late 1990s and early 2000s.9 
This strategy keeps the idea of  a nominal price anchor (determined by the 
target	towards	which	inflation	expectations	are	meant	to	converge)	but	
allows the exchange rate to be adjusted to help reduce external imbalances. 
Under this monetary regime, the main instrument for stabilization is the 
short-term	interest	rate,	seeking	to	influence	the	portfolio	decisions	of 	
economic agents and the various components of  aggregate demand. 
During	the	recent	boom,	this	strategy	was	associated	with	exchange-rate	
appreciation that aroused, in some countries, substantial and heightened 
concerns as to the direction that structural change was heading.
8 A nominal anchor is a nominal variable that the government seeks to control in order to contain 
inflation expectations.
9 Unlike the Caribbean countries mentioned, some of the larger economies of this subregion 
(Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guyana) have a flexible rate of exchange (see Alleyne, 
Hendrickson and Amonde (2011), table 2).
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IV. BusIness CyCle and InVestMent
a. Cycle specificity in latin america and the Caribbean
Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	is	not	the	only	region	where	external	
shocks and policy responses combine to shape cycle dynamics. But the 
cycle in the region does have some particular traits,10 as shown in the 
quantitative analysis set out below, focusing on 1990-2010. 
Table 3 shows that the average duration of  recession phases of  the cycle 
in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	(both	region-wide	and	subregionally)	is	
similar to other countries in the sample (roughly four quarters).11 In South 
America, recessions lasted an average of  5.6 quarters; in Central America 
and	 the	Dominican	Republic,	 recessions	were	 shorter	 (3.0	 quarters).	
Nor	does	recession	amplitude	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	vary	
significantly	with	the	rest	of 	the	world.	The	average	fall	in	the	recession	
phase of  the cycle in South America and Mexico was 8.0 %, whereas in 
Central	America	 and	 the	Dominican	Republic	 the	drop	was	much	 less	
pronounced. This difference is explained by the fact that the most intense 
crises in the period under study —the Mexican crisis (1994-1995), the 
Asian crisis (1997-1998), the Russian crisis (1998) and the Argentine crisis 
10 Pérez Caldentey and Pineda (2010); Titelman, Pineda and Pérez Caldentey (2008). See also 
Male (2011) and Harding and Pagan (2005). 
11 A standard method described in the literature on business cycles was used to identify turning 
points (maxima and minima) in real GDP series, using quarterly data from a sample of 59 
countries for 1990-2010. The turning points made it possible to identify GDP expansion and 
contraction phases. An expansion is a period of positive GDP growth; a contraction is a period 
of negative GDP growth. Subsequently, the duration and amplitude of economic activity 
expansions and contractions were estimated for countries, regions and subregions. Duration 
refers to the length of an expansion or a contraction between turning points. Amplitude refers 
to the change in economic activity between turning points. 
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(2001-2002)— had their epicentre in Mexico or South America. The 
countries	of 	East	Asia	and	the	Pacific	underwent	contractions	that	were	
similar in amplitude to those of  South American countries. 
Table 3
duratIon and aMplItude oF real Gdp eXpansIons and 










Amplitude of the 
downswing 
(percentages of GDP)
South America 19.9 27.5 5.6 -8.0
Central America and 
Dominican Republic 20.5 26.3 3.0 -3.3
Mexico 23.0 25.6 4.3 -8.0
Brazil 14.3 15.6 2.8 -3.0
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 19.7 25.3 3.8 -6.2
East Asia and  
the Pacific 31.5 42.4 3.6 -9.4
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 29.1 52.3 4.0 -12.2
OECD member 
countries 34.0 29.8 4.3 -5.1
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
official figures from the countries.
By contrast, expansions in	 Latin	America	 and	 the	Caribbean	 are	
shorter than in other regions in the sample. The difference is especially 
marked (12 or more quarters) compared with the countries of  East Asia 
and	the	Pacific	and	the	developed	(OECD)	countries.	The	amplitude	of 	
expansions	varies	significantly	among	regions.	In	East	Asia	and	the	Pacific,	
GDP	grew	 an	 average	 42.4%	during	 expansions,	which	 lasted	nearly	
32	quarters	(eight	years).	During	expansions	in	Latin	America	and	the	
Caribbean,	which	lasted	less	than	20	quarters,	GDP	grew	by	just	25.3%.
The difficulty faced by the region’s economies in sustaining 
expansions has impaired their ability to reverse the effects of  recessions 
on the production structure, which helps explain the low average growth 
rate	over	the	past	20	years.	This	difficulty	stems	from	a	less	diversified	
and integrated production structure that keeps the region from reaping to 
the	fullest	the	growth	stimulation	benefits	of 	rising	external	and	domestic	
demand and from seizing the opportunities for trade specialization 
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associated with intra-industry trade. Short expansions are the other face 
of 	low	dynamic	efficiency	in	the	production	structure.	
An	analysis	of 	fluctuations	 in	 the	demand	components	of 	GDP	
shows that investment retreats far more sharply than other components 
on the downswing. Its behaviour is also clearly asymmetric, with changes 
during cycle downswings being much sharper than during upswings. 
This dynamic is particularly marked in the case of  public investment in 
infrastructure,	which	contracts	12	times	faster	than	GDP	overall.
This dynamic depends on how governments respond to crises 
—especially their decisions on public investment— and on slackening 
private investment. In the case of  public investment, both regionally and 
as	a	percentage	of 	GDP,	the	highest	level	was	recorded	in	1980-1981	
(6.7%), after which the percentages declined gradually until 1999-2003 
(3.9%). In 2004-2010, there was a widespread recovery (4.8%) although 
the intensity varied across countries. In this period, the regional average 
rose to its highest level since 1990. Nonetheless, in some countries (the 
Dominican	Republic,	El	Salvador	and	Guatemala),	the	level	of 	public	
investment remained persistently low throughout 1980-2010. The recent 
improvement notwithstanding, the historically procyclical behaviour of  
public investment and its long-term downtrend are worrying because of  
their negative impact on growth.
The pattern of  private investment has been different. Expressed as a 
region-wide	average	percentage	of 	GDP,	it	fell	from	14.3%	in	1980-1981	




examples are the dot-com crisis in the United States and domestic crises 
such	as	the	one	that	hit	Argentina	in	2000.	During	2004-2010,	when	the	
region’s export commodity prices soared and growth prospects improved, 
the pace of  private investment picked up substantially and brought the 
regional	average	up	to	15.9%	of 	GDP.
Foreign	direct	investment	is	figuring	increasingly	heavily,	especially	
in the most dynamic and technology-intensive areas of  the service 
sectors (telecommunications and banking); manufacturing (automobile, 
chemical and metalworking industries) and natural resources (mining). 
Transnational companies, including those that were born in the region (the 
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trans-Latins)	base	these	investment	decisions	on	three	kinds	of 	strategy:	
tapping domestic markets, seeking natural resources and developing 
export platforms (often from free zones). What is missing in the region 
is strategies seeking advanced assets (technology and skilled human 
resources).	This	 reflects	 the	weaknesses	 in	 the	growth	pattern	and	 in	
policies for bringing about virtuous changes in that pattern.
Both investment and the production structure have been hit hard by the 









recovered (Period II) despite faster growth in 2003-2008.
Figure 6
trend Gdp For latIn aMerICa and the CarIBBean and
east asIa and the paCIFIC, 1960-2010 a




































































source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Bank, “World Development Indicators” and “Global Finance” [online] http://www.
gfmag.com/.





The basic difference between the two paths is between a virtuous 
model (such as in East Asia, where there was positive structural change) 
and	the	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	model	with	its	pattern	still	defined	
by its static comparative advantages. Apart from the duration of  cycle 
phases, what is important is what is done during these phases to improve 
the pattern of  specialization and the production structure. The region’s 
cyclical behaviour and its impact on the growth path pose policy design 
challenges that will be discussed later.
To summarize, the region’s cycle dynamic has specific traits. 
Expansions cannot be sustained, translating into shorter periods of  
economic growth. Investment rates drop sharply in recessions but do not 
respond as strongly to expansions. As a result, the region’s production 
structure has been unable to move towards dynamic sectors that would 
make it more competitive in a fast-changing world. This affects long-term 
growth rates. The trend break in the 1980s illustrates this dynamic: what 
began	as	a	cycle	fluctuation	turned	into	a	structural	lag.
B. policy responses, the cycle dynamic and  
structural change
The	lack	of 	an	integrated	production	matrix	deflects	the	dynamism	of 	
demand growth towards imports, blunting its multiplier and growth 
accelerator effects and thus its impact on learning. Policy responses 
can	 either	 heighten	 or	 lessen	 these	 consequences	 (ECLAC,	 2007	 
and 2010a).
After the economic reforms that began in the mid-1980s in most 
of  the region and broadened in the 1990s, the prevailing trend was to 
abandon industrial policies and dismantle the institutions charged with 
carrying them out. The very idea of  targeted policies was rejected. With 
very few exceptions (particularly Brazil), there was a move towards 
horizontal policies that, supposedly, were sector-neutral. Because these 
policies were not implemented or were very limited in scope, tradable 
sectors and activities had to face rapid trade liberalization and exchange-
rate appreciation without the new institutional context helping them 
respond or make the necessary adjustments.
Macroeconomic policies made great strides on several fronts, 
such	 as	 fiscal	 balance	 and	 inflation	 control	 (which	 are	 prerequisites	
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for development policy). But they did not make enough progress on 
other fronts, with major issues related to equality and structural change 
going unaddressed. 
Fiscal policy should encompass important objectives related to 
equality, smoothing the economic cycle and promoting structural 
change.	ECLAC	has	been	a	pioneer	in	calling	for	a	new	social	covenant	
to strengthen the State on the basis of  a higher, more progressive tax 
burden as each country’s degree of  development permits.12
As	for	fiscal	policy	and	equality,	most	of 	 the	 region	has	made	
significant	 progress	 in	 tax	 revenue	 over	 the	 past	 few	decades.	But	
serious problems remain, including a low tax burden in many countries 
and the regressive distributive impact of  the tax structure. The region’s 
countries	have	less	difficulty	collecting	indirect	taxes	than	(potentially	
progressive) direct taxes such as personal income and property taxes. 
Increasing the tax burden and improving the distributive impact of  
the tax collection structure are important issues for the development 
agenda	of 	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean.	But	it	should	be	borne	
in mind that public spending is the main redistributive instrument 
of 	 fiscal	 policy.	 International	 comparisons	 show	 that	most	 of 	 the	
redistributive effort in developed countries is based more on public 
social spending, and the system of  transfers in particular, than on 
the tax system.13 
The	low	direct	tax	burden	reflects	not	only	high	levels	of 	non-
compliance, evasion and avoidance, which work against the principle 
of  horizontal equity, but also the relative narrowness of  the tax base. 
All of  this renders virtually ineffective the redistributive impact of  
income tax. The (vertical) inequity resulting from the proliferation 
of  income tax exemptions is compounded in turn by the degree of  
evasion, which tends to be much higher for income tax than for value 
added	tax	(VAT).	(Jiménez,	Gómez	Sabaini	and	Podestá,	2010).	Not	
only has tax policy increased the general taxation of  consumption by 
strengthening	VAT,	but	the	income	tax	focus	has,	essentially,	been	on	
the income of  juridical persons and only to a much lesser extent on 
12 The main contribution in this regard can be found in ECLAC (1998) and is expanded and 
developed in ECLAC (2000, 2004 and 2010a) and elsewhere.
13 See Goñi, López and Servén (2008). Analysing fiscal policy in Central America, the Dominican 
Republic and Panama, Barreix, Bes and Roca (2009) find the distributive impact of public-
sector social spending 4.4 times greater than that of tax policy in those countries.
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income of  individuals, reducing its redistributive effect.14 The burden on 
social security income is also very low, which is symptomatic of  both the 
high level of  informal employment and the wide variety of  public- and 
private-sector social security arrangements in the region.15
From a macroeconomic viewpoint and as an integral part of  
development	policies,	fiscal	policy	has	a	role	to	play	in	stabilizing	economic	
activity and reducing external imbalances. The historical experience of  
Latin	America	and	 the	Caribbean,	and	more	 recently	 the	 response	 to	




One of  the main lines of  action for strengthening the capacity for 
countercyclical	measures	is	the	consolidation	of 	fiscal	space	or	leeway.	Fiscal	
solvency is a precondition for taking countercyclical measures, although 
conditions in the external sector are equally important in determining the 
public sector’s room for manoeuvre (Martner and Tromben, 2004). 
Macroeconomic policy management has improved in most of  the 




sector to be an insurmountable obstacle to, for example, extending the 
coverage of  their social protection systems.
Fiscal policy performance has shown positive signs in the past decade. 
In	the	past,	the	fiscal	policy	of 	the	region’s	countries	was	often	procyclical	
in	that	it	accentuated	economic	fluctuations	instead	of 	attenuating	them.	
This tendency changed in the 2000s, with many countries adopting a 
countercyclical stance, or at least a less procyclical one, as can be seen 
from the effectiveness of  the governments’ response to the international 
recession	of 	2008	and	2009	(ECLAC,	2010b).
14 This becomes clear, for example, in a comparison with the countries of the European Union, 
where direct and indirect taxes represent 16.1% and 11.7% of GDP, respectively, whereas 
in Latin America they represent 5.4% and 9.6% of GDP. The average personal income tax 
take in the region is less than 1% of GDP (in 2000-2008 the figure was in fact 0.46% of GDP), 
whereas in the OECD countries it accounts for 9.1% of GDP. The difference is also substantial, 
though considerably smaller, in the case of corporate income tax, with receipts in 2000-2008 
averaging 1.6% of GDP in the region’s countries and 3.3% of GDP in the OECD countries. See 
also Rossignolo and Gómez Sabaini (2011).
15 The tax burden is larger in the countries of the Caribbean than in those of Latin America, but 
the split between direct and indirect taxes is similar.
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Everything indicates that the region is now better prepared to design 
and	 apply	 countercyclical	 fiscal	 policies.	 Implementing	 such	 policies	
poses	 two	major	 challenges.	The	first	 is	 to	 have	 enough	fiscal	 space	
to undertake the extra spending necessary to boost aggregate demand 
and	economic	growth	during	downturns.	This	extra	fiscal	space	can	be	
generated by increasing public savings during the boom phase so that 
the impact of  adverse shocks can be managed without jeopardizing the 
financial	sustainability	of 	the	State.	
The second challenge is that greater fiscal space should be 
complemented by an improvement in the economy’s external position, so 
that internally generated resources can be supplemented by others from 
abroad.	In	other	words,	countercyclical	fiscal	policy	should	be	based	on	
a monetary and exchange-rate policy aimed at accumulating international 
reserves in order to avoid external strangulation and at real exchange-rate 
levels	that	prevent	the	emergence	of 	an	unsustainable	external	deficit.	
One of  the main reasons that the region’s countries were able to react in 
2008-2009 was the external leeway available in much of  the region in the 
run-up to the crisis, either for exogenous reasons (improved terms of  
trade,	favourable	international	financial	conditions)	or	for	endogenous	
ones (alertness to the negative effects of  excessive external borrowing 
at times of  high international liquidity, and policies for external 
deleveraging and building up international reserves). Structural change 
is thus crucial for increasing the long-run growth rate compatible with 
external	equilibrium	and	creating	space	for	fiscal	policy	to	work	without	
creating current account vulnerabilities.
Last,	as	discussed	when	examining	the	relationship	between	cycle	
and	 investment,	 the	use	of 	fiscal	 space	 to	promote	 structural	 change	
via public investment has been weak in the region, and it is declining. 
Public investment has mostly been used as an adjustment variable during 
crises. Its historically procyclical pattern and tendency to decline over the 
long run are a drag on growth. The lack of  industrial policy providing 
an investment horizon and a productivity expansion path heightens the 
negative impacts of  the long-term decline in public investment, especially 
when infrastructure investment is cut back.







in slowing the price spiral during the second half  of  the 1990s. In the 
late	1990s,	inflation	rates	tended	to	converge	to	the	single	digits	virtually	
everywhere in the region, with just a few exceptions.
In many cases, price stabilization was achieved by implementing 
monetary programmes that used the exchange rate as a nominal anchor, 
not only in the smaller economies of  Central America and the Caribbean 
(where this type of  monetary regime is still fairly predominant), but also in 





exchange-rate channel, as opposed to the credit channel, tends to be the 
main mechanism transmitting monetary signals to prices.17 In regimes with 
a	flexible	exchange	rate	and	unrestricted	financial	account	openness,	any	
rise (fall) in the domestic interest rate will attract (drive) capital into (out 
of) the country, and the local currency will tend to appreciate (depreciate). 
This will directly affect domestic prices for tradable goods, and thence 
inflation.	Less	immediately,	it	will	affect	the	evolution	of 	credit,	which	
may actually expand faster if  a “wealth effect” arises on the demand 
of  credit as a corollary of  currency appreciation (Stiglitz and others, 
2006;	Ocampo,	2011).	Thus,	in	countries	with	little	financial	deepening,	
a	contractionary	monetary	policy	will	tend	to	reduce	the	inflation	rate	
primarily through the exchange-rate channel, and only to a lesser degree 
through the credit channel.18 This is what is known as the trilemma in 
international	economics:	the	impossibility	of 	having	an	open	financial	
account while at the same time exercising an active monetary policy and 
meeting exchange-rate targets. 
16 Fixed parity regimes used “hard” pegs (currency boards, dollarization and fixed exchange 
rates) and “soft” pegs (crawling pegs and crawling bands).
17 See Barbosa-Filho (2008), Frenkel (2008), Galindo and Ros (2008), Bresser-Pereira (2010) 
and Ros (2012). The discussion about the relationship between exchange rates and inflation 
targets is also quite relevant in some developed and transition countries. See, in this regard, 
Bernanke and Woodford (2004).
18 This does not mean that the credit channel is not operative in the region’s countries, but 
that it is less important than in advanced economies where the financial system is far more 
developed. This lesser importance is due not only to the smaller degree of development and 
depth that usually characterizes the region’s financial systems, but also to the contradictory 
effects of monetary policy decisions.
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Precisely because the exchange-rate channel is more effective, 
the authorities usually react quickly to the smallest possibility of  an 
increase (devaluation) in the nominal exchange rate by increasing the 
policy interest rate, intervening directly in the currency market, or 
some combination of  the two in order to prevent this passing through 
to prices. But they do not react this way to a decrease (exchange-rate 
appreciation). In practice, this leads to asymmetry in exchange-rate 
management by central banks in developing countries or those with 
little	 financial	 deepening.	 This	 asymmetry	 is	 built	 into	 the	 system	
of  incentives underlying inflation targeting regimes. This bias is 
problematic, as it is detrimental to the production of  tradables and 
can	work	against	production	diversification	(Abeles	and	Borzel,	2010).
The central role of  the exchange rate has profound implications 
for the production structure. If  macroeconomic policy strongly affects 
macro	prices,	it	will	have	an	impact	on	relative	sector	profitability	(and	
hence on the direction of  investment) that will be hard to reverse by 
means of  industrial policy —even more so when industrial policy 
is	 weak	 or	 non-existent,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 in	most	 Latin	America	 and	
Caribbean countries. Moreover, the external imbalances associated with 
appreciation usually culminate in crisis and devaluation, exacerbating 
the real and nominal instability of  the economy as well as exchange-
rate volatility. 
C. Macro prices and production specialization
The production specialization dynamic depends on economic incentives 
and	the	behaviour	of 	the	agents	of 	production.	Differences	in	sector	
returns determine where investments will go. If  higher returns are 
associated with less knowledge-intensive sectors, the production structure 
will remain locked in a technologically less dynamic path. And if  due 
account is not taken of  negative environmental externalities, cost and 
return signals skew the growth model in an unsustainable direction. This 
blocks the development of  new technologies that would, for example, 
open up less carbon-intensive energy alternatives for transport, urban 
development and production.
Technology	 asymmetries	 between	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	
Caribbean, on the one hand, and developed countries on the other are 
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more marked in knowledge-intensive sectors. These differences open 
a productivity gap, undermine competitiveness and make returns in 
these sectors lower than in sectors specializing in natural-resource-
based export products. In the absence of  active policies to change 
relative rates of  return, the negative relationship between technology 
intensity	and	profitability	will	persist	and	help	reproduce	the	existing	
pattern of  specialization.
International	price	shocks	have	reinforced	the	relative	profitability	
structure and preserved production structure inertia. Against a backdrop 
of  burgeoning commodity demand, the openness model consolidated a 
vector of  incentives that caused the self-reinforcement of  the region’s 
specialization in products that already provided its competitive base (see 
figure	7).	Investment	decisions	guided	by	relative	returns	are	reinforcing	
the current path. In this scenario, macro prices are not encouraging 
investments that could diversify the production structure and strengthen 
forward and backward linkages. 
Figure 7
latIn aMerICa: return on assets By seCtor, WeIGhted  
aVeraGe, 2000-2005 and 2006- 2010 a
(Percentages)













source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department of América 
economía magazine.
a Weighting based on each company’s share of sector sales. Natural resource-based industries 
include cement and aluminium, iron and steel, chemicals, petrochemicals, paper and pulp, 
and agribusiness.
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Overcoming	 this	 problem	 calls	 for	 redefining	 the	 sector-based	
structure of  investment incentives. This is a challenge that public policy 
cannot afford to ignore in the next few years if  the aim is to bring about 
structural change that also creates quality jobs. 
Against this background, the region’s exports to its three largest 
extraregional	markets	 (Asia	and	the	Pacific,	 the	United	States	and	the	
European Union) were concentrated in raw materials and natural resource-
based	manufactures.	This	reflects	a	trend	towards	reprimarization,	driven	
by the high natural resource prices prevailing throughout most of  the 
period	(see	figure	8).
Figure 8
latIn aMerICa and the CarIBBean: eXport struCture By 
teChnoloGy IntensIty, 1981-2010 a 
(Percentages of the total)
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High-technology manufactures Medium-technology manufactures
Low-technology manufactures Raw materials-based manufactures
Raw materials
source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the 
United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
a Cuba and Haiti not included. Data for Antigua and Barbuda refer only to 2007, and data for the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela only to 2008; data for Honduras do not include 2008; data for 
Belize, Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Grenada (exports 
only) do not include 2009.
There is no virtuous structural change without a shift in investment 
direction	towards	sectors	with	dynamic	efficiency.	In	Latin	America	and	
the Caribbean, the trend towards currency appreciation, terms of  trade 
shocks and an industrial policy vacuum have all reinforced the pattern of  
specialization in sectors with static comparative advantages. The outcome 
has been production structure lock-in and a technology lag.
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V. the soCIal dIMensIon In  
struCtural ChanGe
Two distinctive characteristics of  the region’s economic and social 
structure are a sharply heterogeneous production structure and high 
levels of  inequality in different areas, which are usually captured in its 
high income inequality indexes. Structural heterogeneity refers to the 
coexistence in a single economy of  highly productive sectors together 
with a heavy preponderance of  low-productivity segments. The countries 
in the region tend to have a poorly diversified, commodity-based 
export	 structure;	 this	 influences	 the	production	 structure.	Difficulties	
in propagating technical progress tend to perpetuate productivity gaps 
both within countries and in relation to economies which are quicker to 
incorporate such progress. 
Structural heterogeneity and income inequality are linked through 
the labour market, in particular through workers’ wages. Inequality in 
wage income stems from productivity differences, but not only between 
branches of  activity or segments of  production. Worker productivity 
varies sharply within segments19 and sectors, too, and the differences are 
associated largely with asymmetries that include dissimilar education levels. 
Labour	market	institutions,	such	as	wage	negotiations	and	the	minimum	
wage,	 also	 come	 into	 play	 in	 this	 first	 link	 between	productivity	 and	
19 Segments are defined by firm size and the occupational category of workers. The high-
productivity segment comprises employers and workers in firms with 200 or more employees, 
while the low-productivity one includes employers and workers in enterprises with up to 5 
employees, as well as unskilled self-employed workers, unpaid family members and domestic 
workers. The medium-productivity segment is made up of employers and workers in small and 
medium-sized enterprises (6 to 199 workers). See Infante (2011).
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wages.	These	factors	affect	workers’	capacity	to	benefit	from	the	fruits	
of  the production process and the way in which the returns on capital 
and labour are distributed to pay for their contribution.
The manner in which these individual income gaps (together 
with the differences in returns on labour and capital) pass through to 
household income inequality is affected by public policies, access to 
non-productive assets and demographic factors. With regard to public 
policies, contributory transfers (pensions) and non-contributory transfers 
are important sources of  total family income, and whether they contribute 
to greater equality depends on how progressive they are. Similarly, direct 
taxation can also contribute to greater equality of  disposable household 
income	if 	it	is	progressive.	Lastly,	the	level	of 	income	inequality	in	a	society	
will also depend on two other crucial factors: access to non-productive 
assets and demographic factors.
The labour market and its institutions, which are a nexus between 
production structure heterogeneity and sharp household income 
inequality, have behaved differently in the various stages of  the business 
cycle in the region’s economies. The countries of  the region have seen 
that rising unemployment and stagnating employment do not occur 
solely during periods of  economic standstill or recession. Economic 
growth in 1990-1997 did not produce an improvement in labour market 
indicators. Several factors hurt employment in this period; while largely 
associated with the economic reforms implemented in the region they 
also had to do with the region’s limited absorption of  the technical 
and production transformations occurring in the global economy. 
Thus, in an institutional context characterized by weak employment 
policies, increasing trade openness (in many cases heightened by 
exchange-rate appreciation) and labour-saving technical and production 
transformations on a global scale, the growth of  the 1990s did not 
create enough jobs nor did it avoid a sharp rise in unemployment. 
Consequently,	the	severe	distributive	problems	that	had	intensified	in	
the previous decade remained uncorrected. 
In 1998-2002 (a period of  slack economic growth in the region) the 
unemployment rate continued to trend up while employment virtually 
flatlined.	The	fresh	upswing	in	2003-2010	brought	major	changes:	this	
time, growth was accompanied by a falling unemployment rate and an 




measures were rolled out to stimulate growth, with a positive effect on job 
creation	(ECLAC/ILO,	2011).	Redistributive	policies	had	a	direct	effect	on	
the demand for consumer wage goods and the increase in production of  
these	goods	for	the	domestic	market,	thereby	contributing	to	Keynesian	
efficiency.	This	trend,	together	with	a	favourable	international	context	
of  economic growth both at the global level and, in particular, among 
the emerging economies, underpinned an improvement in labour market 
indicators in the region. Real wages rose in both growth phases, but only 
in the more recent period were better employment rates combined with 
steady	and	significant	gains	in	labour	income.	The	rise	in	real	income	in	
the more recent period is not explained by the economic upswing alone; 
labour policies, especially as regards the minimum wage, also played an 
important role. 
Over these business cycles, the region’s labour market saw substantial 
qualitative transformations (see table 4). First, in the past two decades 
the services sector, which accounts for the largest number of  jobs in the 
region, has increased its share to the detriment of  agriculture. Second, 
in the recent growth period (2003-2010) wage employees increased as a 
proportion of  total employed. The percentage had been relatively stable 
in	the	first	economic	growth	period	(1990-1997)	and	in	what	is	referred	
to as the lost half  decade (1998-2002). 
Table 4
latIn aMerICa and the CarIBBean: ChanGes In Gdp and  
laBour MarKet IndICators, 1991-2010
(Percentages)
1991-1997 1998-2002 2003-2010 1991-2010
Cumulative rates
Change in GDP 26.2 8.9 35.6 86.5
Change in unemployment rate 17.7 20.4 -34.8 -7.6
Change in gross participation rate 1.6 1.2 5.8
Change in gross employment rate -0.6 5.7 6.5
Average annual rates
Change in GDP 1.7 3.9 3.2
Change in unemployment rate 3.8 -5.2 -0.4
Change in gross participation rate 0.3 0.2 0.3
Change in gross employment rate 0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.3
source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data 
from CEPALSTAT.
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The recent uptick is still incipient, but it is a good sign in that it 
indicates that the growth of  employment is being driven by the creation 
of  better quality (wage) jobs. While own-account work continues to serve 
as backup option in the region and is still concentrated in low-productivity 
areas,	it	is	trending	down	for	the	first	time	in	two	decades.	
Notwithstanding these changes, the structural traits of  the region’s labour 
markets, linked as they are to structural heterogeneity, persist. As shown in 
figure	9,	in	Latin	America	two	thirds	of 	GDP	(66.9%)	is	generated	by	the	
high-productivity segment, 22.5% by the medium-productivity segment and 
just 10.6% by the low-productivity segment. But this distribution pattern is 
reversed for job creation: the high segment accounts for just 19.8% of  new 
jobs, the medium segment 30% and the low segment 50.2% (Infante, 2011). 
In	addition,	as	shown	in	figure	10,	there	are	large	gaps	between	the	high-,	
medium-	and	low-productivity	segments	in	terms	of 	GDP	per	employed	
person. This sharp disparity between the different segments’ contribution 
to	GDP	and	employment	 translates	 into	a	very	unequal	distribution	of 	
the returns on productivity gains among workers. Heterogeneity in the 
region’s	production	structures	is,	then,	reflected	in	huge	productivity	gaps,	a	
distribution of  employment that is inversely proportional to productivity in 
each segment, and sharp wage income inequality.
Figure 9



























source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
R. Infante, “América Latina en el ‘umbral del desarrollo’. Un ejercicio de convergencia 


























source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
R. Infante, “América Latina en el ‘umbral del desarrollo’. Un ejercicio de convergencia 
productiva”, Working Paper, No. 14, Santiago, Chile, June 2011, unpublished.
In all the countries of  the region, aside from their greater or 
lesser production structure heterogeneity, women’s labour market 
participation and youth unemployment are highly stratified. The 
stratification	 of 	 female	 labour-force	 participation	 is	 associated	with	
lower education levels among poorer women and fewer available jobs 
in these sectors because labour markets have been raising education 
requirements.	However,	stratification	also	largely	reflects	very	limited	
capacities and alternatives for women to reconcile paid and unpaid 
work. When resources are scarce, households larger and social 
and cultural connections weaker, women’s options shrink and the 
possibility of  entering the labour market diminishes. In the case of  
youth	unemployment,	socioeconomic	stratification	is	compounded	by	
a slower response to economic growth; this has widened age disparities. 
Rising real income for workers has not, in most countries, led to 
improvements in the functional distribution of  income. In general, 
the	wage	share	of 	national	income	in	the	countries	of 	Latin	America	
and the Caribbean has shown the same downward trend seen at the 
international level, even during economic upswings (see table 5). The 
evidence appears to show that wage earners have captured only a limited 
share of  productivity gains in many of  the region’s countries.
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Table 5
WaGe share oF InCoMe, at FaCtor Cost, 1990-2009











State of) a 39.0 39.7 37.8 31.1 1.9 -4.9 -17.7 -20.3
Brazil a 53.5 47.1 46.8 48.3 -11.9 -0.7 3.2 -9.7
Chile 38.7 44.1 46.7 44.5 13.9 5.8 -4.6 15.0
Colombia 41.6 40.7 37.2 36.1 -2.2 -8.6 -3.0 -13.3
Honduras 54.1 50.1 50.8 47.5 -7.3 1.3 -6.4 -12.1
Mexico 32.2 32.7 35.6 31.4 1.6 8.6 -11.8 -2.6
Panama 58.6 39.3 38.6 35.2 -32.9 -2.0 -8.7 -39.9
Paraguay a 43.4 57.1 49.2 47.2 31.6 -13.9 -4.0 8.8
Peru 24.9 27.3 27.5 23.3 9.8 0.5 -15.2 -6.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian  
Republic of) 31.1 37.0 36.1 33.5 18.8 -2.4 -7.3 7.6
source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a  For Brazil, Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the most recent available data are for 2006.
The outlook is better with regard to the personal distribution of  
income in the region. Whereas in the 1990s and through the early 2000s, 
inequality trended up in most of  the countries, in the past few years it has 
turned downward in in a large set of  countries, and this does not appear to 
have been changed by the recent economic crisis. It is not easy to weight 
the causes behind this trend. Explanations run from citizens’ demands for 
greater equality to economic factors such as transfers and the dynamics of  
the labour market. Consensus does exist that what happens in the labour 
market is the most important factor in the reduction of  household income 
inequality and that non-contributory transfers have had a deconcentrating 
effect. It is not yet clear whether the fall in labour income inequality is 
due fundamentally to the increase in the relative supply of  skilled workers 
or the increase in the relative demand for unskilled workers associated 
with expanding production of  non-tradable goods. 
A pro-equality dynamic linked to structural change calls for a labour 
market in which the growing supply of  skilled workers is matched by 
equally dynamic demand. Enhanced bargaining power would allow 
workers to capture a larger share of  productivity gains (in the form of  
higher real wages). This process will not unfold spontaneously, but rather 
will require simultaneous actions on three fronts: industrial policies that 
promote structural change, macroeconomic policies for growth and 
employment, and rights-based social protection systems.
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VI. polICIes For an InteGrated VIsIon  
oF deVelopMent
a. Industrial policy
The	 pattern	 of 	 production	 specialization	 in	 Latin	America	 and	 the	
Caribbean has locked the production structure into activities that are 
environmentally	 inefficient	 and	 not	 very	 knowledge-intensive.	 The	
activities	benefitting	from	the	ongoing	technological	revolution	account	
for a small share of  this structure, thus worsening the productivity gap. 
To overcome this inertia, the structure of  relative returns needs to be re-
geared in favour of  knowledge-intensive sectors; this can only be achieved 
by means of  industrial policies aimed at creating new manufacturing, 
primary or service sectors. Such policies are critical to development 
that incorporates and goes beyond competitiveness policies designed to 
improve	the	efficiency	of 	existing sectors.
Creating new sectors was among the region’s prime industrial policy 
objectives until 1980, but it lost legitimacy during the ensuing decade 
as the new economic model ushered in by reforms took root. Much 
of  what the region has done since then falls under the umbrella of  
“competitiveness policies”.20
After an initial period extending through the mid-1990s, when the 
wave of  reforms all but wiped industrial policies off  the public agenda, 
there was a resurgence of  interest in competitiveness. Competitiveness 
20 It is useful to maintain the distinction between industrial policy and competitiveness policy, in 
order to highlight the need for policies geared towards creating new sectors in the strict sense. 
Competitiveness policies are not enough to change the production structure because not all 
sectors have the same potential for reaping the same benefit from efficiency gains. Of course, 
creating sectors entails developing pertinent economic agents and institutions.
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policies (even those that were fundamentally sectoral) were far more 
concerned	with	making	existing	sectors	more	efficient	than	with	creating	
new ones, something that was consistent with seeking a greater share of  
international markets —particularly on the basis of  static comparative 
advantages	(IDB,	2001;	Melo,	2001;	Peres,	1997).
Competitiveness policies in the region can be grouped as follows, 
in accordance with the degree of  acceptance they have attained 
(which	 is	no	 reflection	on	 their	 effectiveness):	policies	with	 strong	
legitimacy, policies with weak legitimacy and emerging policies. Policies 
with strong legitimacy include those that are most highly regarded 
by governments. In addition to policies for promoting exports and 
attracting foreign direct investment, this group includes policies 
to foster development and innovation in science and technology; 
human resources development, including business training; support 
for micro and small and medium-sized enterprises and production 
development at the local level. These policies are accepted because 
they are perceived as sector-neutral since they operate on markets 
for production factors (technology and training) or contribute to 
job creation.21
Policies with weak legitimacy are those that are more clearly in 
contradiction with the current development model. They include 
direct	fiscal	subsidies,	non-targeted	tax	exemptions,	directed	credit	and	
subsidized borrowing rates, foreign trade tariffs and the use of  the State’s 
purchasing power.
Emerging policies (in particular pro-competition measures, regulation 
of  infrastructure sectors, and environmental policies) are acquiring 
growing legitimacy but are still maturing and are at very different stages 
of  development in the countries of  the region.
Policy documents in the region have seen considerable content 
convergence over the past decade, except as regards acceptance of  
sectoral policies. This convergence is evident in six policy components: 
(i) an emphasis on raising competitiveness in the global market; (ii) the 
legitimacy of  horizontal or neutral instruments (which are actually far 
from it, as seen ex post; (iii) support for micro and small enterprises, 
21 These competiveness policies do not encompass the entire universe of government action 
affecting the competiveness of an economy. Other measures include macroeconomic policy 
and infrastructure development policy.
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because of  their capacity to create jobs; (iv) the growth of  programmes to 
support production clusters; (v) the strengthening of  science, technology 
and innovation policies and, more recently, policies for widespread 
availability of  broadband Internet; and (vi) the targeting of  subnational 
or local economic areas.
The fact that these elements have remained a fairly constant feature 
of  competitiveness policies would suggest that a stock of  skills and 
experience has been accumulated that could serve as a basis for designing 
and implementing updated industrial policies.
In the early 2010s (and unlike what has been happening in other 
development policy areas) there is still no sectoral policy convergence among 
the	countries	of 	Latin	American	and	the	Caribbean.	While	in	a	decreasing	
number	of 	countries	the	official	stance	is	strongly	against	these	policies	
(although sectoral support is provided on an ad hoc basis), in others they 
are recognized as a valid way of  raising the competitiveness of  activities 
that have the potential to penetrate external markets or that face stiff  
competition from imports.22
The slow comeback of  sectoral policies is out of  step with the 
pressing need to move forward on structural change. The idea of  
reinstating the use of  industrial policies to create new sectors rather 
than just boosting competitiveness should be given greater legitimacy 
and placed at the centre of  the policy agenda. These policies are 
crucial in enabling the region to participate fully in the unfolding 
technology revolution, promoting environmentally sustainable paths 
in nanotechnology, biotechnology, new materials and information and 
communications technologies.
With	some	exceptions,	the	degree	of 	policy	implementation	in	Latin	
America and the Caribbean has been low. The causes behind policy 
implementation failures and the resulting divide between what is decided 
and what is actually done are varied and include (i) non-operational or 
unattainable	objectives;	(ii)	shortage	of 	human	or	financial	resources;	
(iii) insufficient institutional capabilities; (iv) weak public-private 
agreements; and (v) weak economic signals.
22 Brazil is the best example of this gradual return to sectoral policies since 2003. Noteworthy in 
Brazil’s experience are continuity of priorities (in particular, innovation and competitiveness); 
flexibility to deal with unforeseen problems; a growing concern with setting explicit goals, 
mobilizing instruments and interacting effectively with the private sector; and integration with 
other development policies, such as education and science and technology (Ferraz, 2012).
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What can be done to close the gap between what is decided and 
announced, and what is actually done and evaluated? First, policymaking 
should	include	identification	of 	the	implementing	agencies.	Given	the	
shortage	of 	qualified	human	resources	in	those	areas	of 	the	State	that	are	
involved in policy implementation, a second line of  action is to transfer 
to	 these	areas	highly	qualified	staff 	with	an	executive	profile	who	are	
currently engaged in policymaking. A third line of  action is to develop and 
strengthen policy operators, that is, institutions and individuals who will 
ensure policy implementation through a combination of  policymaking, 
action and funding capabilities.
In weighing industrial policy strategies, the countries of  the region 
should consider the criteria for deciding which sectors to promote, 
the policy instruments that are available, and the political will to take 
such action.23
The criteria for targeting sectors are based on differing views of  the role 
of 	the	market	and	the	importance	of 	efficiency	based	on	comparative	
advantages	for	allocating	production	resources.	Views	that	rely	on	market	
constraints	 for	 efficient	 allocation	of 	 production	 resources	 hold	 that	
capacity-building occurs on paths far removed from static advantages 
(Cimoli,	Dosi	 and	 Stiglitz,	 2009)	 that	 tend	 to	be	 concentrated	 in	 the	
manufacturing sector because of  increasing returns, technology spillovers 
and innovation (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2006). By contrast, other views 
favour	market	efficiency	more	and,	while	recognizing	the	need	to	diversify	
the economy, stress that the economy should move close to comparative 
advantages	(Lin,	2011).
The available instruments for implementing such policies consist mainly 
of  combining competitiveness policy instruments with direct public-
sector	financing	instruments	(particularly	national	development	banks),	
fiscal	 stimulus	measures	 and	public	 investment,	 as	well	 as	managing	
the purchasing power of  the State and State-owned enterprises. Such 
policies are designed to provide temporary conditions that contribute 
to	 the	 profitability	 of 	 new	 activities	 and	 technology	 paths,	 such	 as	
widespread availability of  broadband Internet access to make way for 
cloud computing. Another powerful sectoral policy instrument is direct 
State investment, which can be through the State-owned enterprises 
23 Other key variables to be borne in mind are constraints stemming from the size of domestic 
markets and the stock of skills in each country in the region, as well as the space for action 




Even though there is a great deal of  room for manoeuvre in this area, it 
is little used in the region.
As for the political will to implement sectoral initiatives, conditions in 
the region are ambiguous. Even in countries that do not regard sectoral 
policies as legitimate, they are practiced in an ad hoc way, and crisis-hit 
sectors often receive targeted support. The question is, then, what has 
to be done to increase their legitimacy.
Two lines of  action are paramount. First, there is a need to improve 
implementation capacity, narrowing the gap between policymaking and 
the policy implementation ability of  institutions. The persistence of  this 
gap damages the credibility of  policymakers and hence of  the policies 
themselves. Second, there needs to be a move away from implementation-
based policy impact evaluation towards objectives-based evaluation.
Despite	significant	progress	since	the	days	when	the	belief 	was	that	
“the best industrial policy is none at all”, a crucial question remains open. 
Beyond improving the implementation and evaluation of  policies geared 
towards diversifying the production structure, it is necessary to bolster 
social agents interested in seeing these policies applied on a wide scale in 
the countries of  the region, that is to say, agents that would pledge their 
economic and political resources to initiatives of  this type. Industrial 
policies	have	made	a	slow	comeback	in	Latin	America.	For	these	policies	
to have more than a marginal impact, social actors (including the State) 
should commit to them and back them up with their authority and 
resources, linking them with macroeconomic, social and environmental 
policies to drive an integrated vision of  development.
B. Macroeconomic policy
The macroeconomic policy recommendations put forward herein follow 
two	lines	drawn	from	the	analytical	framework	of 	this	report.	The	first	
line involves increasing the number of  instruments, which is the requisite 
counterpart to increasing the number of  policy objectives because, 
in addition to real and nominal stabilization, macroeconomic policy 
should send signals that are conducive to sustainable structural change 
and the progressive redistribution of  income for equality. The second 
line entails coordinating this broader universe of  instruments. The 
structural change for equality - suMMary
56
goal is to avoid the problems that arise from adding objectives without 
instruments or from amassing instruments whose effects contradict each 
other. This calls for developing and harnessing complementarities and 




of 	 structural	change.	 In	Latin	America	and	 the	Caribbean,	both	 tax	
collection and public spending have much room for improvement in 
advancing	towards	fiscal	policy	for	equality.	In	most	of 	the	countries	the	
tax burden is lower than it should be (given the degree of  development 
in each case), and it is concentrated in taxes that are generally regressive 
(indirect taxes). As a result, income redistribution does not substantially 
improve after taxes and public spending (compared with before), 
unlike what happens in the developed countries. There is, then, space 
for making the tax system more progressive. This should be done by 
means of  improved design and collection of  income and property 
taxes, coupled with targeted spending. This is not an easy course to 
take because there are marked structural constraints, such as the size of  
the informal sector, low average income levels and the administrative 
weaknesses of  the tax system, not to mention the resistance that direct 
taxes	usually	spark.	Despite	these	difficulties,	it	is	essential	to	strengthen	
the tax system and make it more progressive, not only for promoting 
equality	but	for	building	the	fiscal	space	that	the	State	needs	to	act	on	
the cycle and foster structural change. 
As for countercyclical policies, it is necessary to build on the progress 
made over the past decade, buttressing the automatic stabilizers that make 
it possible to combine countercyclical objectives with the goals of  equality. 




limited by high degrees of  informality and weak institutions. 
Stabilizers	can	be	combined	with	fiscal	rules	that	help	build	fiscal	
space during boom times.24	And	discretionary	fiscal	spending	should	
24 Designing a fiscal rule based on structural balance poses substantial methodological 
challenges, above all in estimating sustainable GDP growth. This calls for paying special 




to respond to frequent, unexpected shocks from a highly volatile 
globalized economy. 
The fiscal dimensions should mesh with the objectives of  
sustainable structural change. Automatic stabilizers help sustain 
demand; they therefore work to boost investment rates. Fiscal rules 
and discretionary spending can incorporate and express the structural 
change objectives set by industrial policy. Well-crafted public investment 
programmes (whose implementation provides a stable horizon as 
to the amount and direction of  investment and a stable reference 
point for private investment) make it possible to successfully pair 
countercyclical objectives and the goals of  structural change. As the 
expectations of  private agents converge towards sustainable structural 
change, the impact of  public investment is multiplied by attracting 
private investment. The legitimacy and international support aroused 
by investments in sustainable technologies would be a draw for external 
funding for countercyclical policies, enhancing the contribution already 
being	made	by	multilateral	financial	institutions.	
Along	 these	 same	 lines,	fiscal	 revenue	 stabilization	 funds	 act	not	
only to stabilize government revenue and spending but also to curb 
excessive currency appreciation during booms (along with their impact 
on macro prices). Natural-resource price booms provide the region 
with	opportunities	for	creating	new	financial	instruments	or	improving	
existing ones. Good governance of  natural resources refers to the 
policy framework regarding the ownership of  those resources and the 
appropriation and distribution of  rents therefrom to maximize their 
development impact. Good resource governance requires (i) progressively 
increasing the capture of  rents from extractive sectors during price booms; 
(ii) channelling this funding towards long-term investments in capacities, 
technology innovation and development, and infrastructure, among 
others; (iii) investing rents from non-renewable resources according to 
the basic rule of  long-term sustainability known as Hartwick’s Rule;25 
and (iv) institutionalizing proper macroeconomic management of  rents, 
preventing them from having a negative impact on the exchange rate and 
the production system. 
25 Hartwick’s rule defines the amount of investment in capital stock (buildings, roads and 
knowledge stocks, for example) that is needed to offset declining stocks of natural resources 
and maintain the standard of living of a society into the indefinite future (Hartwick, 1977).
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It is important to recover monetary policy autonomy in the face of  the 
substantial constraints that the trilemma poses for many countries. Monetary 
policy where the credit channel starts to prevail over the exchange-rate 
channel	leaves	more	room	for	controlling	inflation	without	opening	flanks	
on the external front. Recovering that autonomy requires regulating the 
financial	account	so	as	to	mitigate	the	destabilizing	effects	of 	external	short-
term	capital	flows	(through	credit	bubbles	and	asset	overvaluation,	especially	
in non-tradable sectors) during booms or times of  high international 
financial	market	liquidity.	With	financial	account	regulation,	opting	for	a	
managed	float	regime	boosts	the	likelihood	of 	pursuing	an	independent	
monetary policy. Without that regulation in place, the exchange-rate regime 
cannot stand up to speculative attacks or massive movements of  capital. 
An international reserve management policy is an essential tool for 
a	managed	floating	 exchange-rate	 system.	The	 costs	 and	benefits	 of 	
accumulating reserves should be considered when implementing such 
a	policy.	Benefits	 include	disincentivizing	 speculative	 short-term	capital	
movements and providing greater protection against sudden capital 
outflows.	A	comfortable	 stock	of 	 international	 reserves	would	make	 it	
possible to avoid sudden balance of  payments adjustments, especially during 
downturns when there is more danger of  sudden or sharp devaluation. On 
the other hand, the costs include a lower return on short-term investment 
of  international reserves than on alternate uses for them. Where foreign-
exchange-market interventions carried out to build reserves are not 
sterilized,	there	is	an	additional	cost	associated	with	inflationary	pressures.	
By	contrast,	sterilization	measures	have	a	quasi-fiscal	cost.
Action	 on	 the	 financial	 account	 front	 should	 be	 coupled	with	
macroprudential	policies	geared	towards	regulating	the	domestic	financial	
market to make it sounder and ward off  systemic risk from bubbles, 
manias and panics and their high costs for the economy and society. 
In a number of  countries, limits on loan-to-collateral, debt-service-to-
income, and borrowing and growth ratios, as well as minimum reserve 
requirements and dynamic provisioning, have proven to have effective 
countercyclical effects regardless of  the level of  development or the 
exchange-rate regime in place in the country in question. 
Effective implementation of  policies restricting external and 
domestic sources of  instability before their impacts become irreversible 





fragility and the inevitable corrections that ensue. On the external 
front, by moderating the exchange-rate appreciation and avoiding 
severe, unsustainable macro price distortions they lessen the aggregate 
demand stimulus, the accumulation of  current account imbalances and 
the mounting uncertainty as to the future rate of  exchange, among 
other impacts. These factors lengthen the investment horizon, prevent 
discrimination against tradable sectors and provide a stable framework 
for expanding output. Progress is thus made towards real stability 
and	external	equilibrium	and	efficacy	 is	 restored	 to	monetary	policy	
instruments such as interest rates and control of  monetary aggregates. 
Above all, monetary policy recovers its role in managing aggregate 
demand through the credit channel, and the economy becomes less 
dependent	on	fiscal	policy	for	controlling	inflation.	This	task	can	be	
facilitated by income policies based on price and wage hike coordination 




from some of  its aggregate demand management responsibilities and thus 
allow it to be used to encourage investment in technology and production 
paths	with	greater	dynamic	efficiency	and	sustainability.	For	another,	they	
prevent or reduce macro price distortions that work against industrial 
policy in favour of  tradable goods and the economies of  scale that only 
the global market can provide.
It is highly unlikely that industrial policy will yield productivity gains 
that could offset sharp currency appreciation. The macroeconomy can 
completely undermine industrial policy for structural change. What 
is more, excessive appreciation often elicits defensive trade policy 
measures that draw industrial policy away from its long-term objectives. 
Macroeconomic policy should therefore be seen as an integral part of  
a policy for structural change, and it should create competitiveness 
conditions conducive to that change. Over the long run, the effects of  
growing returns and technology convergence should prevail, making the 
output of  tradables less dependent on the exchange rate and more closely 
linked to technology learning and knowledge. 
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C. structural change and social and labour policy
The structural change proposed herein, which entails stimulating 
high-productivity activities, is distributive policy par excellence. In 
the long run, the set of  economic development policies that would 
spur virtuous structural change are distributive initiatives in the broad 
sense in that they would change how the production process generates 
income. This structural change would create job opportunities in 
the highest-productivity sectors and increase employment overall. 
Income for the population would rise; the end result would be more 
egalitarian distribution.
In the short and medium terms, though, higher demand for skilled 
workers in expanding high-productivity sectors could fuel an increase 
in	labour	inequality	and	hence	in	total	inequality.	During	the	transition	
towards more homogenous economies with greater productivity, the 
large share of  the informal sector in the region’s labour markets will 
continue to be the main challenge for social protection. This is an area 
where	 the	 region	 still	 has	 profound	 deficits	 to	 address.	There	 could	
also	 be	 significant	 friction	 in	 the	 labour	market,	which	 should	 have	
mechanisms for protecting the workers with the greatest vulnerabilities 
to such contingencies. The positive impacts of  structural change should 
be channeled through labour institutions like the minimum wage and 
collective	bargaining	in	order	to	help	fulfil	the	specific	rights	of 	quality	
jobs and contribute to a more egalitarian distribution of  the fruits of  
progress and of  productivity gains. 
Unemployment insurance programmes, in addition to their 
countercyclical potential, play a key role as compensatory mechanisms 
during structural change that would rearrange the sector mix of  the 
demand for skilled workers. Such programmes should mesh with labour 
intermediation services and training and job creation policies (direct job 
programmes	and	labour	demand	subsidies).	Depending	on	the	situation	
it will be necessary to create or enhance public employment systems 
that integrate job search support with training and unemployment 
benefits.	 Information	and	communication	 technologies	are	a	key	 tool	
for	more	efficiently	matching	workers	and	businesses.	Stepping	up	the	
public investment in infrastructure that structural change requires will 
boost job creation. Public job programmes designed to make up for the 
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recomposition of  labour demand during structural change constitute 
another instrument; such programmes should be coupled with training 
and job search support.
There are institutional features in the labour relations that are 
crucial for translating productivity gains into distributive improvements 
and	better	job	quality.	Employee	profit-sharing	should	be	considered	
an integral part of  collective bargaining, based on the premise that the 
active	involvement	of 	workers	is	crucial	for	optimizing	gains	(Durán,	
2011).	Legal	regulations	should	ensure	another	right	that	is	essential	for	
overcoming exclusion from quality employment and guaranteeing that 
productivity gains are transferred to workers: unionization and collective 
bargaining. Following a marked decline in unionization in the region, 
the past decade has seen trade union organization rise in a number of  
countries. In some cases, legal changes facilitated collective bargaining 
(for example, for outsourced workers and female domestic workers). 
This raises a need to move towards the formalization of  social dialogue 
by embedding it in government agencies, in the form of  social dialogue 
councils that are already operating in some countries in the region.
While	ECLAC	has	 argued	 that	 employment	 is	 the	main	 route	 to	
social inclusion, it also recognizes that, in the short and medium terms, 
the very segmentation of  access to quality jobs will prevent the region 
from achieving the levels of  welfare to which it aspires. The classical 
contributory equation between employment and social protection does 
not balance because the large proportion of  informal employment 
limits the possibilities for increasing productivity and contributory social 
protection for much of  the working population. It also determines the 
type of  employment open to those who are outside the labour market or 
unemployed. As a result, the non-contributory pillar of  social protection, 
which in developed countries was intended to cover a residual sector of  
the population, has come to occupy a central role. It is imperative that 
redistributive	 instruments	providing	 specific	protection	guarantees	be	
created or enhanced.
In terms of  both coverage and spending, the non-contributory 
pillar is still a long way from reaching all of  the population experiencing 
the most acute vulnerabilities. The expansion and consolidation of  this 
pillar remains a priority objective and calls for enhanced institutional and 
financial	stability.
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Structural change should provide another pro-equality mechanism 
that goes beyond reducing wage gaps and ensuring a fairer distribution 
of  productivity gains among the factors of  production. It involves the 
State appropriating some of  those gains, through taxation, to boost 
funding for social policies targeted at sectors of  the population that 
are	experiencing	 the	greatest	difficulties	or	need	more	 time	 to	 secure	
better-paid, quality jobs. Capitalizing on leaps in productivity to build 
more robust and inclusive social protection systems is part of  the agenda 
combining structural change with equality. 
The redistributive capacity of  national tax systems in the region is, 
at best, poor or non-existent. This means that there is room for making 
the tax system more progressive, which should be done by improving 
the design and collection of  taxes on income and wealth. This is no easy 
road, as there are strong structural constraints, including a large informal 
sector, low average income levels and weak tax agencies, as well as the 
resistance that direct taxation often triggers.
Last,	in	this	context	of 	structural	change	action	is	needed	to	match	
the labour supply to the requirements of  the new demand, especially 
in training and capacity building. Promoting virtuous structural change 
(and creating jobs in higher-productivity sectors) must be paired with a 
push for equal opportunities in building capacities, both in the formal 
education system and in training systems. Education and job training 
systems, and systems for disseminating the use of  information and 
communications technologies, need to be rethought and retooled in 
keeping with national projects for transitioning towards knowledge-
intensive societies and economies.
Most countries in the region have tested a wide range of  education 
system reforms and have injected an increasing share of  their total social 
expenditure into the sector. While it is true that upcoming generations 
will have more years of  formal education than their predecessors, neither 
the increased resources nor the direction of  reforms have succeeded in 
narrowing educational attainment gaps between social groups, nor have 
they led to clear improvements in the quality of  education, measured as 
relevant learning throughout the formal education cycle.
A	number	of 	challenges	may	be	identified	in	relation	to	vocational	
education and training. First, it is necessary to ensure that a growing 
proportion of  young people without a university degree enter the 
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workforce	with	 qualifications	 as	 non-university	 technicians	 or	 skilled	
workers, steadily expanding the proportion of  workers with intermediate-
level training. Non-university technical training is still weak in many 
countries of  the region. Second, the technological and organizational 
changes so typical of  today’s labour market require workers to constantly 
acquire new knowledge and skills as part of  a lifelong learning process. 
Adopting social and labour policies with a clear redistributive impact, 
such as those proposed herein, means recognizing that the State has a key 
role to play in harmonizing structural change with equality. On the one 
hand, the State must ensure that labour market institutions promote a 
fairer distribution of  productivity gains between the various actors in the 
production structure. On the other hand, it must promote an integrated 
social protection system based on progressive social spending and 
progressive taxes that addresses the risks and vulnerabilities that occur in 
the workplace and in workers’ families as a result of  the transformation 
dynamics inherent in structural change. Finally, given the lags and gaps in 
human capacities and the mismatch between the requirements of  labour 
demand and the characteristics of  labour supply, the State must take on 
all the challenges posed by the knowledge society in this area: a more 
educated society where the development of  relevant skills for the new 
world of  production and communication is a universal right, coupled with 
an integrated job training system that includes technical education and 
vocational training components and provides employment opportunities 




VII. ConCludInG reMarKs: polItICs  
and the state In an InteGrated  
approaCh to deVelopMent
The integrated approach emerging from these proposals calls for 
coordinated action by involved, committed stakeholders. It also needs 
robust,	efficient	 institutions	that	can	regulate,	guide,	target	and	even	
fund many of  the actions needed to turn these proposals into reality 
over time.
Politics and the State are, therefore, pivotal. Politics, because of  the 
need to bring stakeholders together in forging social covenants to ensure 
support for this approach and for its continuity over time. The relationship 
between structural change with equality and political legitimacy is a 
two-way street. Political will and good policy are, therefore, conditions 
—or, rather, achievements— that should be the building blocks of  a 
profound change that requires agreements and a shared ethic for reaching 
compromises among the actors involved in structural change. 
But this also requires a different kind of  State. It is not enough for a State 
to	exhibit	administrative	probity	and	efficient	use	of 	resources	(although	
these are essential if  society is to trust its government). The State must be 
able to substantively mobilize and communicate its citizens’ aspirations 
for well-being and progress by means of  messages that link the present 
and the future.
What is also needed is a State with a clear ability to rally stakeholders 
around	far-reaching	projects.	In	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	there	is	
no other actor that could shoulder this role of  coordinator in the face of  
the complex industrial, macroeconomic, labour and social policy scenario 
that is the setting for the integrated approach proposed in these pages. 
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In	this	second	decade	of 	the	twenty-first	century,	there	is	evidence	
at the national, regional and global levels that coordination and regulation 
are	 essential	 in	 a	wide	 range	 of 	 spheres	 (finance,	 trade,	 production,	
environment and migration, among others). It is the State that can regulate, 
oversee, target and coordinate at the national level, both inwards and 
outwards, from a vantage point that encompasses all facets of  development. 
There is also a need for a State with clear goals for driving many of  
the processes proposed under the aegis of  structural change with equality 
and environmental sustainability. This calls for appropriate incentives 
and robust investments that, at the same time, target knowledge-
intensive sectors, activities that absorb quality jobs and are competitive 
internationally, and a technology paradigm that ensures lower carbon 
intensity	 and	 high	 energy	 and	 environmental	 efficiency.	 It	 is	 equally	
essential to invest in human capacities for structural change and greater 
equality in the generational changeover. Policies must be devised and 
funded to provide a shield against the risks of  income loss and to 
guarantee minimum levels of  well-being during the transition towards a 
new production and information paradigm. All of  this also requires new 
fiscal	covenants	and	arrangements	that	enable	the	State	to	capture	more	
resources for promoting economic growth while translating that growth 
into a more broad-based and progressive tax strategy. 
The role of  the State is even more important when an integrated 
vision of  development like the one proposed herein is involved. The 
complementarities and synergies between the macroeconomy and the 
production structure and between the business cycle and short- and 
long-term growth trends thus challenge the State to determine how to 
achieve the most virtuous possible combination of  macroeconomic policy 
and industrial policies based on a new technology paradigm that is more 
knowledge-intensive	and	environmentally	efficient	and,	at	the	same	time,	
more conducive to social inclusion and equality.
 Macroeconomics for development cannot dissociate cycle 
management and (real and nominal) stability from structural change 
and a higher rate of  long-term growth. This pairing must be part of  
an integrated approach by the State where production change and a 
levelling up of  capacities and social opportunities are explicit priorities. 
This process should be accompanied by social policy (especially during 
temporary stages of  structural change when production is still not the 
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universal prime route to inclusion with well-being). Achieving equality 
does not necessarily run counter to investing in and protecting the 
environment (the material substrata for development). To the contrary: 
the idea is to achieve virtuous linkages between economic, social and 
environmental factors by means of  reindustrialization.
With this long-range, forward-looking vision, the structural change 
with equality and sustainability proposed herein has on its horizon 
the leading role to be played by coming generations in achieving 
fulfilment	of 	 their	 rights	 and	 their	potential.	 It	will	 fall	 to	 these	new	
generations to fully develop the capacities required by a groundswell of  
changes in productivity, knowledge and technological progress, citizen 
involvement, deliberative culture and environmental stewardship. These 
are the generations who will have to promote new ways of  producing, 
organizing and communicating. They are also the ones who will be tasked 
with preserving and promoting the well-being of  all in societies under 
increasing pressure from population ageing, growing urbanization and 
scarcer global public resources. And these generations are the ones who 
will have to live with the effects of  several centuries of  predatory natural 
resource use and the diminished capacity of  those resources to sustain 
high rates of  growth.
That is exactly why there is no time to lose. The time has come to 
push for change for the sake of  greater productivity and greater equality. 
In some spheres, the pace is being set by the speed of  the technology 
revolution, production paradigm shifts, the demographic transition, the 
financial	crisis	and	environmental	disasters.	Experience	has	already	shown	
what	works	and	what	does	not.	Looming	threats	to	political	stability	and	
citizen safety need to be addressed by bringing the future closer to the 
present and stepping up government and political action for development 
and social inclusion. There is room for this in the political imaginary, 
which is no longer haunted by the spectre of  single models and has more 
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In today’s complex and changing global context, the Latin American and Caribbean 
region must persevere, more than ever, in three directions: structural change to 
underpin progress towards more knowledge-intensive sectors, convergence to 
reduce internal and external gaps in income and productivity, and equality of 
rights. This is the integrated approach proposed by ECLAC as a route towards the 
development the region needs.
This implies tackling three major challenges: to achieve high and sustained rates 
of growth so as to close structural gaps and generate quality jobs; to change 
consumption and production patterns in the context of a genuine technological 
revolution with environmental sustainability; and to guarantee equality on the 
basis of greater convergence in the production structure, with universal social 
protection and capacity-building.
Such an endeavour requires the return of politics and of the State’s role in promoting 
investment and growth, redistribution and regulation with a view to structural 
change for equality, through industrial, macroeconomic, social and labour policies. 
These are some of the key proposals of Structural Change for Equality: An 
Integrated Approach to Development, which ECLAC will present to its member 
States at the thirty-fourth session of the Commission (San Salvador, August 2012) 
The proposals in that document, which is summarized here, deepen and broaden 
the ideas set forth in Time for equality: closing gaps, opening trails, aiming towards 
sustainable development with equality and taking into account the diverse national 
conditions across the region.
